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Justice from the Ground Up:
Distributive Inequities,
Grassroots Resistance, and
the Transformative Politics of the
Environmental Justice Movement
Sheila Fostert
In this Article, Professor Foster examines the environmental justice
movement from the "ground up "-from the perspective of the predomi-
nantly poor, African-American residents of Chester, Pennsylvania who
attempted to stop the clustering of waste facilities in their community.
From this perspective, Professor Foster evaluates the manner in which
the phenomenon of environmental injustice is framed, the efficacy of
reforms in environmental decision-making processes, and the strategies
and possibilities of grassroots efforts in achieving environmental justice.
She argues that the distributive paradigm that often frames discussions
of environmental injustice obscures the mechanisms and processes un-
derlying inequitable outcomes, thwarting a full understanding of the
phenomenon. Case studies such as Chester, however, illustrate that dis-
proportionate exposure to environmental hazards result from a set of
ongoing social processes that structure the political economy of poor
communities of color. These grassroots struggles provide a window into
the social relations and processes underlying distributive inequities and,
thus, assist reformers in identifying the types of policy reforms likely to
help achieve environmental justice. Professor Foster argues that
Copyright © 1998 California Law Review, Inc.
t Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Camden, New Jersey. The author
expresses her sincere appreciation to the following people for reading and commenting on this
Article at various stages of its development: Luke Cole, Roger Dennis, Giovanna Di Chiro, David
Frankford, Angela Harris, Craig Oren, Jesse Ribot, Neil Smith, the 1996-1997 fellows at the Center
for Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture (CCACC) in New Brunswick, New Jersey, and the
1997 summer interns at the Center for Race, Poverty and the Environment in San Francisco,
California. This Article also benefited tremendously from the expert research assistance of Henry
Komansky. This Article was supported both by the author's year-long fellowship with CCACC, which
was partially funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, and a research grant from Rutgers Law School.
The author also extends her sincere gratitude to Chester Residents Concerned for Quality of Life,
particularly Zulene Mayfield and Jerome Baiter, Esq. Finally, the author thanks Elizabeth Linette for
her continued support throughout the process of writing this Article.
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
achieving environmental justice requires that siting reforms take both
social structure and process seriously. She, however, concludes that
while siting reform is necessary to achieve environmental justice, it
should not displace the kind of transformative political action currently
taking place in communities such as Chester. This political action is
crucial to marginalized communities hoping to gain access and con-
tribute to the policy- and decision-making processes that affect their
material interests.
INTRODUCTION
The environmental justice movement is one of the fastest growing
social justice movements in the United States. The movement has
emerged from a primarily local, grassroots response to the presence and
continued siting of hazardous waste facilities in poor communities and
communities of color. For the last two decades, these communities have
fought back against the injustice they perceive permeates environmental
decision-making. In doing so, they seek justice in environmental policy-
making and administration.
What is the injustice they experience? What is the justice they seek?
There is no clear-cut answer to such questions, especially given the di-
versity of the various local struggles. Any attempt to answer such theo-
retically complex questions must, however, consider the movement at its
source. As many books on the subject illustrate, grassroots struggles
form the core of any epistemological understanding of the movement
and the content of its claims.' By studying the movement at its source
and talking to those actually leading these struggles, we can begin to
understand the normative content of their claims of injustice and their
corresponding struggle for justice.
Both national and regional studies have attempted to "measure"
the phenomenon of environmental injustice.2 These studies have both
benefited and imperiled the movement. While studies documenting the
connection between race and environmental hazards raised national
consciousness about local struggles, they also begged for further ex-
amination of the underlying phenomenon. As Iris Marion Young warns,
1. See, e.g., CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993); FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: CONFRONTING ISSUES OF
GLOBAL JUSTICE (Laura Westra & Peter S. Wenz eds., 1995); UNEQUAL
PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed.,
1994).
2. I use the terms "environmental racism" and "environmental injustice" interchangeably in
this Article. While environmental racism is the better-known term, environmental injustice
encompasses both the racial and class aspects of this phenomenon. See Laura Pulido, A Critical
Review of the Methodology of Environmental Racism Research, 28 ANTIPODE 142, 149 (1996)
(noting that the real challenge in environmental racism research is to "understand how racism
operates in conjunction with a particular political economic system").
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social research and analysis should "aim to evaluate the given in nor-
mative terms. Without such a critical stance, many questions about what
occurs in society and why, who benefits and who is harmed, will not be
asked, and social theory is liable to reaffirm and reify the given social
reality."3 Recently, scholars have attempted to articulate the normative
premises underlying the empirical conclusions.4 These articulations have
helped shift the focus away from a strictly empirical assessment to a
more qualitative analysis of the problem-one that ascertains the social
relations and processes behind the statistics.
While grassroots stories abound in many writings on environmental
justice, there is often a disjuncture between academic theories and the
actual grassroots experiences of environmental injustice. This Article
seeks to draw a more explicit link between the two. I will recount in de-
tail the struggle of the Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living
(CRCQL) in Chester, Pennsylvania, and its efforts to stop the clustering
of commercial waste facilities in this predominantly poor African-
American community.' Although only one case study, Chester is not
unique as a magnet for toxic waste facilities. Chester shares a similar
social, political, and economic history with other areas experiencing a
proliferation of unwanted toxic waste facilities-the community is a
former industrial town, now populated by low-income people of color.6
Moreover, Chester residents' struggle to save their community from the
proliferation of unwanted facilities is similar to many other struggles.7
3. IRIs M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 5 (1990).
4. See, e.g., LAURA PULIDo, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE: Two CHICANO
STRUGGLES IN THE SOUTHWEST (1996).
5. The Chester case study is primarily based on this author's interviews with the leader of
CRCQL, Zulene Mayfield, and the lawyer representing CRCQL, Jerome Baiter. In addition to these
interviews, this author consulted other sources in constructing the case study: CRCQL's web site
detailing their struggle and perceptions of activities surrounding the incoming waste facilities,
numerous newspaper accounts detailing Chester's economic and political history, an award-winning
video about the Chester struggle by a public television station in Philadelphia, see infra note 14, and a
brief account of Chester's struggles by Meta Mendel Reyes, see infra note 17. I use the terms
"CRCQL" and "Chester residents" interchangebly throughout this Article.
6. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice For AlL in UNEQUAL PROTECTION,
supra note 1, at 14-15 (describing the predominantly poor, African-American Altgeld Gardens,
located on the southeast side of Chicago and surrounded by fifty active or closed commercial
hazardous waste landfills, 100 factories, and 103 abandoned toxic waste dumps); Sheila Foster,
Ironbound Committee Against Toxic waste: Fighting From the Grassroots (draft Feb. 8, 1998) (on
file with author) (recounting struggles of former industrial, primarily low-income immigrant
neighborhood of Newark, New Jersey which is home to an incinerator, sewage plant, and a solid
waste transfer station).
7. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental
Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 1, at 33-36 (describing
common grassroots tactics, including public protest, demonstrations, petitions, lobbying local
governments and state agencies, getting ordinances and resolutions passed, compiling reports and
other fact-finding, community hearings, coalition-building, and litigation); Luke W. Cole,
Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law,
19981
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
I invoke the Chester case study to illustrate and explore the contours of
environmental injustice in places like Chester, the efficacy of reforms in
the siting process, and the political strategies and possibilities of locally-
based movements for environmental justice.
Part I of this Article briefly sketches the history, causes, and effects
of Chester's transformation into a haven for toxic waste facilities. It also
describes Chester residents' efforts to establish its claim of environ-
mental injustice based on the State of Pennsylvania's pattern of granting
waste permits. Part II discusses the distributive paradigm in which envi-
ronmental injustice is often framed. This paradigm focuses considera-
tion of social justice on the allocation of material goods, including
environmental quality, and conceives social justice and distribution as
coextensive concepts. Because a purely distributive focus ignores ques-
tions of causation and agency, and obscures underlying social processes,
framing environmental justice within a distributive paradigm has
thwarted our understanding of the phenomenon. This Part explains that
the disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards that communi-
ties such as Chester face can be traced to a set of ongoing social proc-
esses which structure the political economy of poor communities of
color. The siting process, in turn, relies upon, and replicates, structural
inequalities in locating new facilities.
Part I explains why grassroots struggles are important to our un-
derstanding of environmental injustice. Grassroots struggles help us un-
derstand the normative content of environmental injustice claims and
provide a window into the social relations and processes that give rise to
such claims. As a result, the environmental justice analysis appropriately
shifts its focus to the social and structural constraints underlying the
distributive outcomes. Part IV returns to the Chester case study, detailing
its residents' struggle against the proliferation of toxic waste sites in
their community. While their grassroots resistance began as a reaction to
the impact of increasing numbers of waste facilities on the quality of life
in Chester, the resistance quickly became a struggle over the legitimacy
of decision-making processes, the exclusion and marginalization of dis-
affected citizens in those processes, and the structural forces that con-
strain individuals in communities like Chester from fully participating in
decisions that fundamentally affect their lives.
Part V assesses the lessons that can be learned from the Chester
struggle and the efficacy of siting process reforms in addressing the
problems faced by Chester residents. The Chester case study illustrates
that grassroots groups are not just fighting against distributive outcomes,
19 ECOLOGY LQ. 619, 674-79 (1992) (recounting the strategies employed in the struggle for
environmental justice in Kettleman City, California, including public protest, a letter-writing
campaign, community hearings, litigation, and building on community expertise).
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but also against the institutional and social processes that produce those
outcomes. The Chester struggle, along with other grassroots experiences,
further suggest that distributive remedies alone will not achieve justice.
Achieving environmental justice requires that siting reforms take both
social structure and process seriously. This means establishing substan-
tive criteria to prevent decision-makers from relying upon structural
inequalities in the siting process and crafting more inclusive and delib-
erative decision-making processes in which the citizens most burdened
by siting decisions have an equal opportunity to influence the outcome
of those decisions.
Part V, however, concludes that while siting process reforms are
necessary and would address aspects of environmental injustice in
Chester, these reforms should not displace the type of transformative
political action currently taking place in communities such as Chester.
The grassroots organizations created in the midst of struggles for envi-
ronmental justice are crucial in creating an ongoing role for community
participation in all decisions that fundamentally affect the participants'
lives. Success in these communities has meant far more than winning
local struggles to defeat toxic waste facilities in already overburdened
neighborhoods. When local grassroots groups are able to link their vic-
tories in the environmental realm to broader political and economic
struggles, the potential exists to redefine existing power relations, to un-
settle cultural assumptions about race and class, and to create new politi-
cal possibilities for historically marginalized communities in local
decision-making processes.
I
ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE IN CHESTER, PENNSYLVANIA
Chester, Pennsylvania is an urban city of 39,000 residents. Located
along the Delaware River, approximately fifteen miles southwest of
Philadelphia, Chester is a small enclave of people of color within pre-
dominantly white Delaware County. While Delaware County, excluding
Chester, is only 6.2% African American, Chester is 65% African
American.' The median family income in Chester is 45% lower than in
Delaware County and its 25% poverty rate is more than three times the
rate in Delaware County. Unemployment and crime are high in Chester,
as is the rate of health problems. Chester has a mortality rate 40%
higher than the rest of Delaware County, as well as the state's highest
child mortality rate.'
8. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 928 n.I (3rd Cir.
1997) (noting that Delaware County is 91% white and Chester is 32% white).
9. See Craig Offman, Trouble Comes to Toxic Town USA, GEORGE, Mar. 1998, at 94; Brent
Staples, Life in the Toxic Zone, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 15, 1996, at A14.
1998]
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Waste facilities that once promised needed jobs have instead
brought many forms of pollution. From 1986 to 1996, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued seven permits for
commercial waste facilities in Delaware County, five of which were in
Chester. 0 All of the municipal waste and sewage in Delaware County is
processed in Chester, even though only 7.5% of the county population
lives in Chester." Moreover, over 60% of the waste-processing industries
in Delaware County are located in Chester. 2
Living in Chester today can best be described as an assault on the
senses-a toxic assault. During the summer, the stench and noise force
residents to retreat into their dwellings. Recent visitors to Chester are
quoted as saying that the "air is thick with acrid smells and, often,
smoke. Dump trucks rumble through throughout the day,"'3 and "the
first thing you notice is the smell."' 4
These conditions have prompted a citizen uprising against the fa-
cilities. Concerned residents began meeting privately in 1992, spurred
by the noise and dust generated by trucks that brought trash to one of
the largest garbage incinerators in the country-located only eighty feet
from the closest homes in Chester's West End neighborhood. The resi-
dents were most irritated by the huge trucks that would rumble through
their neighborhoods at all times of the day and night, disturbing their
sleep and their children's recreational time, and damaging the overall
character and peace of their community. Noise and vibration from the
constant stream of waste trucks have caused the foundations of nearby
houses to crack and property values to plummet. Residents have felt im-
prisoned in their own community. 5 Only later would they fully appreci-
ate the damaging effects these facilities might have on the health of their
community. "We are not against profit or gain, but we want to gain in
our own areas," said one resident, "we want to live."' 6
10. See Staples, supra note 9 (noting that the five permits issued in Chester were for waste
facilities which had the capacity to handle more than two million tons of waste per year; the permits
issued in the rest of the county were for waste plants with the capacity to process less than one
percent as much waste).
11. See Mark Jaffe, Waste-Site Ruling Aids Chester Activists, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 1, 1998, at
Al.
12. See id
13. Michael Janofsky, Suit Says Racial Bias Led to Clustering of Solid Waste Sites, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 29, 1996, at A15.
14. Laid to Waste: A Chester Neighborhood Fights for its Future, (DUTV television broadcast,
April 1996) (on file with author). "DUTV" stands for Drexel University Television. The station is an
educational access channel operated by Drexel University under agreement with the City of
Philadelphia, Department of Public Property. It appears as cable channel 54 in Philadelphia and can
be reached at (215) 895-1054 or <http://www.duum.oce.drexed.edu/DUTV>.
15. See id. (quoting one resident describing her feeling of being "in jail").
16. Id.
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A. Toxic Assault
The recent incursion of waste treatment facilities into Chester began
in the late 1980s. In 1987, the LCA Leasing Corporation, now defunct,
began operating a waste transfer station in Chester that brought hun-
dreds of truck loads of trash into Chester each day. Shortly thereafter,
Abbonizio Recycling Corporation, a demolition debris recycling com-
pany arrived, creating an enormous amount of dust in the neighbor-
hood. In 1988, despite objections from many Chester residents, and
without their input, 7 the DEP granted a permit for the operation of the
Westinghouse Resource Recovery Facility (Westinghouse incinerator).
The Westinghouse incinerator is one of the largest in the country 8 and
is permitted to bum over 2,000 tons of trash per day. As well as burning
100% of Delaware County's own waste, the incinerator draws trash from
three surrounding states-Delaware, New Jersey, and New York-and as
far away as Ohio to feed its massive burners. 9 "Since 1991, when the
incinerator opened, trucks... barreled down Thurlow Street, once a
quiet residential road, six days each week, often fifteen or more hours a
day."2° The Westinghouse incinerator not only brought trucks and dust,
but also odor and, according to residents, possibly more illness. Adults
in the neighborhood experienced respiratory problems and their chil-
dren missed more school than usual due to unexplained illness.2'
The Westinghouse incinerator and Abbonizio Recycling operate in
a community already surrounded by older industries such as Witco
Chemicals, Scott Paper, British Petroleum, Sunoco Oil, and a twenty-
year-old sewage treatment facility owned by Delaware County Regional
Water Control (DELCORA). Recently, two other facilities have been is-
sued permits to operate in Chester: Thermal Pure Systems-an infec-
tious medical waste treatment facility-and Soil Remediation Systems-
a contaminated soil burning plant. Chester's environmental problems
today are a result of this continuing stream of toxic facilities.
The presence of these facilities may pose a grave health risk to the
Chester residents. When President Clinton issued his Executive Order on
17. See ME'TA MENDEL-REYES, RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY 155 (1995) (noting that few
residents had even "heard about the single public hearing").
18. See A Review of Waste to Energy Trash Incinerators in the U.S.A., WORK ON WASTE, Jan.
1992, at 1.
19. The facility has also not been the best neighbor. It was fined thousands of dollars for
exceeding its permitted levels of sulfur dioxide, hydrochloric acid, carbon monoxide, and other
pollutants between 1992 and 1995. See Martin indars, Westinghouse Settles Over Chester Facility;
Agreement Involves State, Federal Agencies, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 27, 1997, at 6 (reporting
the agreement between Westinghouse, the EPA, and the DEP involving a $400,000 settlement for the
clean-air emissions violations, which includes a $100,000 fine and company sponsorship of a
$100,000 lead abatement program).
20. MENDEL-REYES, supra note 17, at 155.
21. See id. at 153-54.
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Environmental Justice, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) chose Chester as the subject of a six-month cumulative
risk assessment. This study, released in the fall of 1994, found unac-
ceptable cancer and non-cancer risks, such as kidney and liver disease
and respiratory problems, from the pollution sources in Chester.' The
EPA also concluded that (1) blood lead levels in Chester's children are
unacceptably high, with more than 60% of the children's blood samples
above the Center for Disease Control (CDC) recommended maximum
level;2 and (2) air emissions from facilities in and around Chester ac-
count for a large component of the cancer and non-cancer risk to the
citizens of Chester.24 Peter Kostmayer, then head of the EPA Mid-
Atlantic Region, said that although there was a correlation between the
facilities in Chester and poor health in the community, causation was
difficult to prove scientifically, due to other compounding factors.as
Nevertheless, the clustering of facilities in Chester heightens the percep-
tion that the community's poor health status is linked to the surround-
ing waste processing facilities.
B. Tracing the Development of the
Toxic Waste Industry in Chester
At first, the facilities in Chester seemed to appear "out of no-
where."26 However, Chester's vulnerability as a wasteland for toxic dis-
posal can be traced to its economic, social, and political history. As with
many urban areas in which toxic waste facilities are located, Chester's
history as a former industrial haven helped to shape its destiny.
22. See United States Environmental Protection Agency Region III, Environmental Risk Study
for City of Chester, Pennsylvania (visited June 1995) <http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/chester.html>.
23. This level of lead exposure is indeed a cause for great concern. Recent studies have
documented the risks to children from high blood lead levels, including neurological damage leading
to "lower IQ scores" as well as "deficits in psychometric intelligence scores, speech and language
processing, attention, and classroom performance." Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry, Neurologic Effects, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Public Health Service,
Case Studies in Environmental Medicine: Lead Toxicity (visited Nov. 9, 1997)
<http://atsdrl.atsdr.cdc.gov: 8080/HEC/caselead.html> (summarizing lead studies) (on file with
author). A 1990 follow-up report found "a sevenfold increase in the odds of failure to graduate from
high school, lower class standing, greater absenteeism, more reading disabilities, and deficits in
vocabulary, fine motor skills, reaction time, and hand-eye coordination 11 years later." Id. However,
there is no definitive evidence linking the children's blood lead levels to the surrounding facilities.
See Environmental Risk Study, supra note 22 (noting that it is not possible to determine the source of
the lead due to lack of data).
24. See Environmental Risk Study, supra note 22 (noting that two facilities are believed to
account for half the long-term cancer risk). It should be noted that this study is still under full review
and that the EPA has yet to release the full report. The above information comes from a summary of
the EPA's findings released in 1995.
25. See Laid to Waste, supra note 14.
26. Russell, The Perpetrators... Russell, Rea and 2appala (visited Nov. 9, 1997)
<http://www.envirolink.org/orgs/pen/crcql/rrz.html> (CRCQL Web Page).
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Chester's history begins in 1682 when William Penn rowed his boat
ashore at a sandy stretch along the Delaware River, his first landfall in
the Americas.27 Chester's location along the Delaware River "made it
ideal for small-scale manufacturing."28 By the 1770s, Chester was a suc-
cessful mill town, and it prospered as a manufacturing center until the
1940s. During this time, many southern blacks and immigrants from
Poland and the Ukraine moved to Chester. 9 Shortly thereafter, however,
the city began a decline in prosperity that ultimately led to the Chester
of today. As did many urban cities, Chester suffered from the post-war
flight of its manufacturing industry overseas and the flight of middle-
class whites to surrounding suburban neighborhoods. Between 1950
and 1980, 32% of the jobs in Chester disappeared. During the same
time period, the African-American population increased from 20% to
65%.30
Chester is now one of the most economically depressed communi-
ties in Pennsylvania. 1 Predictably, social decline soon followed on the
heels of the economic decline. Chester's school district is one of the
worst in the state. 2 Chester also has the highest crime rate in the state.33
Desperation accompanied this economic and social decline, as
27. See Michael de Courcy Hinds, Pennsylvania City Hopes It's Bouncing Back From the
Bottom, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 5, 1992, at A14.
28. Morgan Kelly, History of Chester (visited Nov. 9, 1997) <http.//www.envirolink.org/
orgs/pen/crcql/history.html> (CRCQL Web Page).
29. See id. (noting that Chester was also "well know [sic] for its jazz scene and it's [sic] good
educational system"); see also Hinds, supra note 27 (noting that the city "thrived for 175 years,
building the first iron-clad ships and becoming one of the world's busiest shipyards").
30. See Kelly, supra note 28; see also Hinds, supra note 27 (chronicling that "at an increasing
pace over the last 40 years, because of high labor costs and increased competition, all but two major
companies closed or moved to the South; at the same time, more southern blacks moved into Chester
and many white residents moved to the suburbs"); Staples, supra note 9 (describing Chester as a
"declining factory town" but "[o]nce a muscular city of 66,000" before "Chester lost a third of its
population-and more than 40,000 jobs-between the end of World War II and the coming of Ronald
Reagan").
31. See Hinds, supra note 27 (reporting "about one of every six residents lives in public
housing, one family in three receives public assistance and about one adult in three is unemployed").
32. See, e.g., Frank Reeves, City Schools Reform Plan Includes Vouchers; State Panel's Report
Seeks Changes in 24 Ailing Urban Districts, PITTsBuRGH POST-GAzETTE, Dec. 16, 1997, at CI
(noting that Chester-Upland School District meets state commission's criteria for "educationally
distressed," which include high dropout rates, failure of a quarter or more of district students to meet
statewide standards, high teacher absenteeism, and student attendance rates 10% or more below
national norms); Master: Chaos is the Norm in Chester Schools; Students Fail Because No One Cares,
Feds Say, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, May 14, 1996, at A4 (reporting that Chester-Upland School District
is on the verge of collapse, according to a federal master, due to poor student performance, high
truancy, and bankruptcy).
33. See Casey Combs, Statistics Show Crime is Worse in Smaller Cities, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAzETTE, Apr. 28, 1996, at FI (supporting analysis with 1996 FBI figures based on incidents
reported by the police).
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evidenced by the city government "[e]ncourag[ing] everything and
anything to come to town to provide jobs." 34
Chester did not become a toxic wasteland on its own, however. Al-
though its history foretold its social and economic vulnerability, the
situation in Chester seems partly the result of its unique political history:
a corrupt Republican political machine that has long controlled many
aspects of local decision-making, and some behind-the-scenes political
machinations.35 Peter Kostmayer, former head of the EPA Mid-Atlantic
Region, recalled hearing from a DEP official that "there were political
figures and their allies that had financial investments in Chester" and
supported Chester as a home to the waste industry.36 A close
34. Laid to Waste, supra note 14 (noting that the mayor of Chester and other politicians pleaded
with the City of Philadelphia to transport and process its waste in Chester).
35. A summary of Chester's political history appears on a CRCQL Web site. In part, the author
explains the history as follows:
Chester's political history is closely linked to its economic history. Since the turn of the
century, with one exception, Chester has been ruled by a corrupt and extremely powerful
political machine. The machine began in 1910 with a Swarthmore dropout named John
McClure. McClure consolidated power over Chester through a campaign founded in
racketeering and bootlegging.
McClure and the Republican party kept tight control over the city's votes by controling
[sic] public funds in such a way that every government function was delivered as a
personal favor.... They were largely responsible for controlling who got jobs.... A paper
in 1967 noted that, when asked why they voted for machine candidates, most African-
Americans responded that it was so they would be able to get a job. Whether or not this was
true, the rumor, the fear of losing a job, was all that was necessary. The machine held the
people in the palm of its hand. By delivering favors on an individual basis it kept the poor
from organizing and bargaining collectively. Effectively, it removed any power people had
in the political process.
After McClure died in 1965, Jack Nacrelli, a local mobster, took control of the party.
He served as mayor until 1979 when he was convicted on tax evasion, bribery and
racketeering. His control was still felt from jail however, and in 1985, his secretary Willie
Mae Leake became the first black mayor of Chester.
Kelly, supra note 28; see also Mark Fazlollab, Chester Softball Fund Probed, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan.
4, 1992, at B3 (reporting that recent investigations have found evidence of corruption in the Chester
City Council, the Redevelopment Authority, and the Resources Recovery Authority, as well as
possible malfeasance involving the City's softball fund). The New York Times reported:
Chester's Republican Party machine, one of the nation's oldest, has also been called one of
the most corrupt in recent decades by state officials. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission,
an investigative agency of the State Legislature, said in a recent report last year that
Chester's government had been dominated by 'a triad of criminals, corrupt politicians and
rogue law-enforcement officers' since the 1960s.
Hinds, supra note 27, at A14.
Of course, political corruption is not unique to a city like Chester. Poor, disenfranchised cities are
known to have a history of corruption in city government. See DAVID L KIRP ET AL., OUR
TowN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA 19, 30 (1995) (describing the political
corruption that has haunted Camden, New Jersey, one of the state's poorest cities).
36. Laid to Waste, supra note 14. Kostmayer is now director of Zero Population Growth (ZPG).
ZPG bills itself as "the nation's largest grassroots organization concerned with the impacts of rapid
population growth and wasteful consumption." See ZPG Online (visited Apr. 9, 1998)
<http://www.zpg.orgt>.
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examination of the present scenario in Chester, including the issuance of
waste treatment facility permits, seems to corroborate this assessment.
The most recent waste treatment facility permits issued in Chester
can be traced to 1985, when Russell, Rea, and Zappala (RR&Z), an in-
vestment banking firm from Pittsburgh, together with Westinghouse,
formed Chester Solid Waste Associates and purchased land in Chester.'
Chester Solid Waste Associates has, as its name implies, brought waste to
Chester-tons of it. RR&Z spoke with Delaware County officials about
the possibility of incineration as "a solution to the county's rising waste
disposal costs and the region's dwindling landfill space;" it also estab-
lished the initial facilities that "brought the first glimpse of waste,
trucks, and trash odors to the neighborhood."38 From there, RR&Z's
deal with Delaware County officials laid the groundwork for the issu-
ance of a permit for construction of the massive Westinghouse incin-
erator. According to Chester residents, RR&Z has retained control over
every facility that has been permitted to locate in Chester, exerting direct
influence over its waste processing tenants. RR&Z owns the land where
the Westinghouse and Thermal Pure waste treatment facilities now sit.
Moreover, most of the recently permitted facilities in Chester-LCA
Leasing, Westinghouse, Thermal Pure, and the proposed Soil Remedia-
tion Systems-appear to share a corporate relationship under, the pur-
view of RR&Z officers. 39
Not surprisingly, RR&Z has been the focus of two direct protests
by outraged Chester residents. The documentary video Laid to Waste'4
documented the first protest, which took place in the summer of 1995.
Community activists drove to RR&Z's Pittsburgh office and demanded
a meeting. RR&Z refused to comply. RR&Z's indifferent attitude in-
fuses a recent press quote: "If a site is economically feasible and passes
all regulatory and zoning inquiries, then it's a viable project."41 Re-
sponding to environmental racism charges, an RR&Z consultant
quipped, "It's not the firm's business to feel anything about commer-
cial transactions, all of which were legally above board and ethical."42
37. See Rick Teaff, Westinghouse, RR&Z Team Up on Waste-to-Energy Plant, PrrTSBURGH
Bus. I n.s & 1, Feb. 8, 1987, at 1; see also Don Hopey, Protestors Target Firm Helping Build Waste
Disposal Sites, PrrrBURGH PosT-GAZETIE, Apr. 13, 1996, at B5.
38. Russell, Perpetrators, supra note 26; see also Teaff, supra note 37 (noting that U.S. Senator
John Heinz (R-PA) inserted a provision into the 1986 tax bill that specifically retained tax benefits for
the incinerator).
39. See Corporate Structure of Russell, Rea & Zappala (visited Nov. 10, 1997)
<http:llwww.envirolink.orglorgs/penlcrcqlrrz-structure.html> (CRCQL Web Page).
40. See Laid to Waste, supra note 14.
41. Hopey, supra note 37, at B5 (reporting the representative also noted that "all of the
businesses were approved by the City of Chester' and that "all of the incinerators have proper
permits from the State").
42. Id. (emphasis added).
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This attitude is not unique to RR&Z's spokesman. It also underlies
the inadequacies of current siting laws which allow this type of toxic
proliferation in communities such as Chester. In Pennsylvania, the siting
process does not consider the cumulative impact of pre-existing facili-
ties with the proposed facility, the disproportionate location of facilities
in the host community,, or the demographics of the targeted community.
Each permit is considered in a vacuum, requiring only that the individ-
ual facility at issue comply with applicable emission regulations and
other technical requirements.43 Moreover, once a facility is located in a
host community, it is easy to expand that facility, allowing even more
waste to be processed in the community." This has happened in Chester,
where the Westinghouse incinerator continues to expand its operations
and import more waste.4"
The established pattern of waste treatment facilities essentially seals
the community's reputation as a toxic wasteland. As Peter Kostmayer
explains, "The presence of facilities molds the aesthetics and the econ-
omy. Other businesses are reluctant to locate where there are so many
waste treatment plants."46 Unfortunately, this has proven true in Chester.
The new businesses that were supposed to locate near the Westinghouse
incinerator have not arrived. Instead, according to resident-activist
Zulene Mayfield, the only new businesses have been prostitution and
drugs.47
C. Making a Case for Environmental Injustice
Today, the toxic assault on Chester continues. Remarkably, even
with knowledge of the community's poor health and stringent opposi-
tion from local officials, in 1995 the DEP granted a permit to yet an-
other facility, Soil Remediation Systems (SRS). SRS proposes to treat
960 tons of petroleum-contaminated soil each day at very high
43. Technical criteria can include factors such as avoiding a certain degree of proximity to
wells, surface waters, residences, recreational areas, wetlands, and endangered species habitat. See
Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA), 1980 Pa. Laws 380 (codified as amended at 35 PA. CONST.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6018.101-6018.1003 (West 1993)); Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection Regulations, 25 PA. CODE § 271.127 (West Supp. 1997) (listing environmental assessment
requirements for municipal waste permits).
44. See Laid to Waste, supra note 14; see also Township of Chartiers v. William H. Martin, Inc.,
542 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1988) (holding "natural expansion doctrine" requires municipalities to allow
landfills and similar facilities to expand); 25 PA. CODE § 271.126(b)(3) (West Supp. 1997)
(exempting permit modification applications that are not considered "major" from environmental
assessment process); MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND
FAIRNESS IN ToxIc AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 55 (1994).
45. See infra Section IV.F (recounting recent decision of waste authority and new owners of
the incinerator to increase the volume of waste shipped to the incinerator).
46. Laid to Waste, supra note 14.
47. See Anne Linden, Pollution in the Delaware Valley: Residents Retaliate, LABYRINTH,
July/Aug. 1997, at 11.
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temperatures in order to burn off contaminants so the soil can be land-
filled. Subsequently, the Cherokee Environmental Group applied for a
permit to process petroleum-contaminated soil by a process called
"bio-remediation," in which microorganisms digest the contaminants
in the soil. If allowed to operate, Cherokee will bio-remediate 900 tons
of contaminated soil per day. Thus far, the residents have successfully
defeated efforts by both SRS and Cherokee to build their facilities in
Chester.4
The long history of environmental degradation, coupled with the
relatively recent assault on Chester by the waste industry, led the com-
munity to ponder what could be done to stop waste facility permits in
Chester. This question led CRCQL to file a lawsuit against the
Pennsylvania DEP alleging environmental racism. In May 1996, Chester
residents invoked Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, claiming that the
DEP's pattern of granting permits in Delaware County is racially dis-
criminatory. As evidence, they pointed to the clustering of waste facility
permits in Chester's predominantly African-American community. The
Chester lawsuit is one of only three lawsuits ever filed against a state
agency in federal court alleging discrimination in the permit-granting
process of waste facilities 9 The lawsuit, however, was not filed directly
under Title VI. Instead, the residents claimed that the DEP violated
regulations, implemented to enforce Title VI, which mandate that any
jurisdiction receiving federal EPA money "shall not use criteria or
methods of administering its program which have the effect of subject-
ing individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national
origin, or sex...."I
If successful, the Title VI lawsuit would establish legally what has
already been determined empirically. 1 As many studies document,
commercial waste facilities are disproportionately located in poor com-
munities of color.52 This disparate impact and its empirical basis have
48. See infra Sections WV.D.-F.
49. The Chester suit is also the only one of the three that involves more than one facility. The
other cases involved a wood-burning plant in Michigan and a waste-water treatment plant in North
Carolina. See Janofsky, supra note 13, at A15.
50. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997) (emphasis added). There are obvious benefits to suing under the
regulations, as opposed to the statute itself. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a violation
of the statute requires proof of discriminatory intent, whereas proof of discriminatory effect suffices
to establish liability when the suit is brought to enforce regulations issued pursuant to the statute,
rather than the statute itself. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comrm'n of New York, 463 U.S.
582, 591-93 (1983).
51. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that Chester
residents have a private cause of action against the DEP under the regulations, paving the way for
CRCQL's lawsuit. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality of Life v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3rd Cir.
1997).
52. See Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Race, Poverty & the Distribution of Environmental
Hazards: Reviewing the Evidence, RACE, POVERTY & THE ENVIRONMENT, Fall 1991/Winter 1992,
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provided substance to claims of environmental racism and environ-
mental injustice. Highlighting the empirical results, even without legal
imprimatur, has been an important political rallying point for environ-
mental justice advocates.
But the weight placed on empirical studies as the defining charac-
teristic or indicia of environmental injustice has also imperiled the prog-
ress of the movement. In the next Part, I argue that the conception of
injustice established by these studies, and the subsequent heavy reliance
upon them in framing the problem, were fraught with risks from the
beginning. Although focusing on the national distributive inequities
provided a starting point for inquiring about the injustice, it provided
little else in the way of a substantive understanding of environmental
racism. As Laura Pulido argues, the hidden assumption underlying em-
pirical work on environmental racism is that racism is a specific thing
whose effects can be neatly isolated. Limiting the concept of environ-
mental racism to discrete and measurable discriminatory acts fosters an
incomplete understanding of racism and injustice. 3
II
FRAMING ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE:
BEYOND THE DISTRIBUTIVE PARADIGM
The movement for environmental justice has existed on a local
grassroots level since the 1970s. It was not until the release of two stud-
ies documenting the connection between race, class, and the distribution
of environmental hazards, however, that the issue received national rec-
ognition. In 1983, a study by the United States General Accounting
Office (GAO) found that three out of four landfills in the Southeastern
region of the United States are located in predominantly poor and
African-American communities.- The United Church of Christ (UCC)
found similar disparities on a national level in its 1987 study.5 The UCC
study measured the demographic patterns associated with commercial
hazardous waste facilities56 and uncontrolled toxic waste sites.57 As for
at 3 (reviewing the numerous studies providing systematic empirical evidence regarding the burden
of environmental hazards by income and race); see also infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
53. See Pulido, supra note 2, at 149-51. Pulido argues that recognizing racism in only
measurable discriminatory acts ignores the way "racism infuses society, including culture, politics,
and economic structures." Id at 151.
54. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND
THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 3-4 (1983).
55. See COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST), Toxic WASTES
AND RACE IN TiE UNITED STATES xii (1987).
56. The UCC study defines "hazardous wastes"--as the term is used by EPA-as "by-products
of industrial production which present particularly troublesome health and environmental problems."
Id. The study goes on to explain that:
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the demographic characteristics of communities with commercial haz-
ardous waste facilities, the study found that race proved to be the most
significant variable in determining the location of commercial hazard-
ous waste facilities. Communities with the greatest number of commer-
cial hazardous waste facilities had the highest percentage of non-white
residents. Its study of uncontrolled waste sites produced similar find-
ings: Three out of every five African-American and Latino residents
lived in communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites. Furthermore,
African-Americans were heavily over-represented in the populations of
metropolitan areas with the largest number of such sites. 8 These studies
further galvanized an already active grassroots movement, and, by high-
lighting the national scope of the problem, added to the already impres-
sive array of regional studies. Since the 1980s, numerous empirical
studies have continued to document the disproportionate impact of en-
vironmental hazards on poor people of color. 9
Empirical definitions of environmental racism, however, construct a
particular conception of injustice and justice. Highlighting the empirical
studies as the sine qua non of environmental injustice created an im-
pression that environmental justice advocates were embracing what Iris
Marion Young calls the "distributive paradigm" of justice. "What
marks the distributive paradigm," according to Young, "is a tendency
to conceive social justice and distributions as coextensive concepts." 6
[N]ewly generated hazardous wastes must be managed in an approved "facility", which is
defined by the EPA as any land structures thereon which are used for treating, storing or
disposing of hazardous wastes (TSD facility). Such facilities may include landfills, surface
impoundments or incinerators. A "commercial" facility is defined as any facility (public or
private) which accepts hazardous wastes from a third party for a fee or other
remuneration.
Id.
57. The term "uncontrolled toxic waste sites" refers to closed and abandoned sites on the
EPA's list of sites which pose a present and potential threat to human health and the environment. As
of 1985, the EPA inventoried approximately 200 uncontrolled toxic wastes sites across the nation. See
id.
58. These areas included Memphis, Tenn. (173 sites), St. Louis, Mo. (160 sites), Houston, Tex.
(152 sites), Cleveland, Ohio (106 sites), Chicago, I1. (103 sites), and Atlanta, Ga. (91 sites). Id.
59. See, e.g., BENJAmiN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FITTON, Toxic WASTES AND RACE
REVISITED: AN UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNrrIs WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 13-18 (1994) (finding that
between 1980 and 1993, the concentration of people of color living in zip codes with commercial
hazardous facilities increased from 25% to almost 31% of the average population around the
facilities and that in 1993 people of color were 47% more likely than whites to live near a
commercial hazardous waste facility); Vicki Been, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios?
A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997) (finding that the
areas surrounding commercial hazardous waste treatment facilities currently are disproportionately
populated by lower-income Hispanics). But see Douglas L. Anderson et al., Hazardous Waste
Facilities: "Environmental Equity" Issues in Metropolitan Areas, 18 EVALUATION REV. 123 (1994)
(finding that the percentage of minorities living in neighborhoods with commercial hazardous waste
treatment facilities is no greater than in areas without such facilities).
60. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 16.
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The normative inquiry of such a paradigm is whether there is a"morally proper distribution of social benefits and burdens among so-
ciety's members."'" Such an inquiry focuses our considerations of so-
cial justice on the allocation of material goods and the distribution of
social positions of reward, status, and prestige."
Focusing on a distributive notion of environmental justice carries
significant epistemological risks. First, distributive notions of justice re-
quire an analysis of agency and causation in institutional and social
processes that lead to the distributive outcomes reflected in the empirical
research. Previous empirical studies have left these questions unresolved.
The failure to explicate the forces behind the disproportionate outcomes
has led skeptics to challenge the empirical and normative assumptions
underlying those outcomes. Second, a monolithic focus on outcomes
overshadows the way in which environmental injustice manifests itself
for different social groups. In this Part, I argue that in order to move
beyond the distributive paradigm, it is necessary both to understand the
institutional and social processes which produce environmental hazard
siting outcomes and to evaluate whether those processes are unjust. Ex-
amining the political economy of communities burdened by dispropor-
tionate environmental hazard exposures and their corresponding
grassroots struggles can aid in this understanding and evaluation.
A. Distribution and Process
A purely distributive focus often obscures our consideration of the
social structure and institutional context that play a role in determining
the patterns of distribution. 3 As Young persuasively argues, absent a
deeper focus on the processes that lead to the racially disparate out-
comes, the distributive paradigm implies an incomplete social ontol-
ogy.' As such, the social justice inquiry must look beyond distributive
61. Id.
62. See id
63. See id. at 18-24. Institutional context means something broader than the mode of production.
Rather, it includes
any structures or practices, the rules and norms that guide them, and the language and
symbols that mediate social interactions within them [in various institutions]. These are
relevant to judgments of justice and injustice insofar as they condition people's ability to
participate in determining their actions and their ability to develop and exercise their
capacities.
Id. at 22. See also Evan Simpson, The Subjects of Justice, 90 ETHIcs 490, 497-98 (1980) (critiquing
the distributive paradigm for failing to bring social structure and class relations into view and evaluate
them).
64. See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 22-24 (arguing that distributive notions tend to ignore three
primary categories of non-distributive issues: decision-making structure and procedures, division of
labor, and culture); see also id. at 29 (noting that distributive measures of injustice myopically focus
on a "pattern of distribution at a particular moment," instead of "the reproduction of a regular
distributive pattern over time" (emphasis added)).
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patterns and instead evaluate the mechanisms and processes producing
inequity.'s
This is not to say that distributive patterns are irrelevant or not criti-
cal to the social justice inquiry. For many issues of social justice, the
evaluation of distributive patterns over time is indeed an important
starting point. In answering the question, "Why is this general pattern
[being] reproduced?" we must evaluate the "matrix of rules, attitudes,
interaction, and policies as a social process that produces and repro-
duces that pattern."'
Distribution thus should be seen not as the sine qua non of envi-
ronmental racism, but instead as a crucial entry point for exploring the
justice of social processes underlying distributional patterns, including
environmental decision-making processes.67 As I will argue later, grass-
roots struggles can provide a window into the processes that produce the
distributive outcomes.68 Through an exploration and analysis of the
decision-making processes and social relations in localized siting deci-
sions, we can begin to understand both the content of specific instances
of injustice and what type of policy reforms would help achieve envi-
ronmental justice.
B. The Problem of Causation
A narrow focus on distribution neglects a search for causation and
agency. As with most statistical research, the studies charting dispropor-
tionately distributed waste facilities simply establish correlations. As
such, the empirical conclusions beg for a causal analysis of the siting
process to explain existing inequities. Not surprisingly, critics have eas-
ily scrutinized the distributive paradigm of environmental injustice with
causation objections.69 The insistence on establishing a linear, causal
65. See id. at 29. See also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 7 (1983) (noting the need
to shift our attention in questions of justice "from distribution itself to conception and creation: the
naming of goods, and the giving of meaning, and the collective making').
66. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 29.
67. In an important way, distributional patterns and decision-making processes are intricately
intertwined. Evaluating decision-making processes often requires an evaluation of distributions. For
instance, a legitimate process may depend upon an adequate distribution of various social goods, or
rights, crucial to participation in that process. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS
163-175 (1989) (arguing that certain rights, goods and interests are integral to a legitimate democratic
process). In turn, decision-making processes determine the distribution of other rights and social
goods. See id. For instance, some social groups approach environmental decision-making processes
with fewer social goods, e.g., time, education, information and specialized knowledge, than more
privileged groups. Not surprisingly, these same groups remain disadvantaged in the distribution of
social goods by those processes. See infra Part V (describing the connection between distributional
inequities and environmental decision-making processes in places such as Chester).
68. See infra Part III.
69. See, e.g., Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L REv. 1001, 1016 (1993) (arguing that one
"causation objection" to the empirical evidence is that it "does not establish that siting choices caused
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connection between undesirable outcomes and a responsible, identifi-
able agent, such as the siting process, permeates our legal and social un-
derstandings of racism and injustice.7 However, the prevailing demand
for proof of causation, particularly underlying civil rights theory and
doctrine, is premised on a static, atomistic conception of agency" which
disaggregates individuals and institutions from their social context.
Understanding environmental injustice requires a broader causal
analysis. Specifically, it requires a conceptual framework that (1) retains
a structural view of economic and social forces as they influence dis-
criminatory outcomes; and (2) isolates the dynamics within
environmental decision-making processes that further contribute to such
outcomes. Yet, understanding environmental injustice requires that we
must also evaluate these social processes. Evaluating processes
the disproportionate impact... on people of color and the poor"): Lynn E. Blais, Environmental
Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L REv. 75,90 (1996) (noting that "while many environmental racism
scholars challenge the equity of the existing distribution based on perceived process failures, none
have advanced a coherent theory of these failures").
70. See Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 721,731-35 (1994).
71. For instance, this understanding is reflected in recent amendments to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting employment discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-16) (West 1994), provides
that the disparate impact of an employer's actions on a particular group gives rise to liability only if
plaintiff can (1) identify with particularity the objectionable employment practice and (2)
demonstrate that the employment practice caused the disparate impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(West 1994); See also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-67 (1989) (requiring
plaintiffs to identify the specific employment practice alleged to cause the disparate impact and to
prove causation in order to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact liability); see also Alan
Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TuL. L Rav. 1407, 1412-13 (1990)
(describing the victim/perpetrator approach, whereby civil rights laws have been interpreted such
that violations occur only where "actions of identifiable perpetrators ... have purposefully and
intentionally caused harm to identifiable victims").
72. A prime example of the type of causation analysis typical in contemporary civil rights cases
is the Supreme Court's holding in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). In Freeman, the Court
terminated a desegregation order imposed on a school district, despite continued racial segregation in
public schools, holding that current school segregation caused by segregative housing patterns was
not enough to justify continued court supervision of the district's duty to integrate. See id. at 495. In
particular, the Court reasoned that "the population changes which occurred in [the] County were not
caused by the policies of the school district, but rather by independent factors ... consistent with the
mobility that is a distinct characteristic of our society." Id. at 494. In fact, "[t]he effect of changing
residential patterns on the racial composition of schools, though not always fortunate, is somewhat
predictable." Id. at 495 (citing a study demonstrating a high correlation between residential and
school segregation). As such, the Court concluded, even though housing segregation can be traced to
discriminatory attitudes, and leads to school segregation, "[w]here resegregation is a product not of
state action but of private choices," it is beyond the "authority and. . . practical ability of the federal
courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and massive demographic shifts." Id. Any attempt
to intervene in these demographic patterns and private choices "would require ongoing and never-
ending supervision by the courts of school districts." Id. Given the Court's narrow view of causation,
community activists and scholars interested in environmental justice must not rely on legal definitions
of causation. Moreover, given the Court's limited view of institutional responsibility, those pursuing
social justice must realize they can no longer expect courts to take the lead in effecting change.
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underlying distributive outcomes requires both empirical and normative
assessments of those processes.73 Case studies like Chester embody a
more multivalent understanding of causation, and can help in evaluating
the social processes underlying distributive outcomes.
1. The "Chicken or Egg" Question
One of the most important causation objections to the empirical
research, upon which the distributive paradigm rests, asks the question:
"Which came first, the environmental hazard or the racial and/or the
class makeup of the neighborhood?"' The suspicion underlying this
objection is that researchers have failed to isolate the particular proc-
esses responsible for producing the racially disparate outcomes. Specifi-
cally, commentators note that studies charting the racially disparate
outcomes fail to compare the demographics of the neighborhoods at the
time the facilities were sited with demographics at the time measured by
the studies. This failure "leaves open the possibility that [the facilities]
were not disparately sited in poor and minority neighborhoods," but
that "market dynamics" led people of color and the poor to "come to
the nuisance," that is, to move to areas surrounding waste facilities be-
cause those neighborhoods offered the cheapest available housing.75 If
this is the case, then such post-siting "market dynamics" would be re-
sponsible for the distributive outcomes, not environmental decision-
making processes.
Vicki Been, for instance, describes two factors which influence the
poor to move to neighborhoods which may be otherwise undesirable to
most people. The first factor is the cost of housing; the second is the
characteristics of a neighborhood. 76 Noting that the housing market in
the United States is "extremely dynamic," Been explains that regardless
of whether Locally Undesirable Land Uses (LULUs) were sited fairly
originally, it could well be that neighborhoods surrounding LULUs be-
came poorer and thus home to a greater percentage of people of color
in the years following the siting. A LULU "may cause those who can
73. Young rejects the division between empirical and normative social theory, arguing that:
no normative theory meant to evaluate existing societies can avoid an empirical inquiry, and
no empirical investigation of social structures and relations can avoid normative judgments.
Inquiry about social justice must consider the context and cause of actual distributions in
order to make normative judgments about institutional rules and relations.
Young, supra note 3, at 29. See also Walzer, supra note 65, at 9 ("Social meanings are historical in
character; and so distributions, and just and unjust distributions, change over time.").
74. See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1384-91 (1994); see also Thomas
Lambert & Christopher Boemer, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 195 (1997).
75. Been, supra note 74, at 1389; see also Lambert & Boemer, supra note 74, at 200-202.
76. See id, at 1388-89.
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afford to move to become dissatisfied and leave the neighborhood," or
it "may decrease the value of the neighborhood's property, making the
housing more available to lower income households and less attractive
to higher income households. ' '"
Since the market is the realm of private transactions, where goods,
services, and information are exchanged in accordance with the ability
to pay, it predictably allocates to the poor the least desirable neighbor-
hoods-including those containing a hazardous waste facility." As Been
explains, "[a]s long as the market allows the existing distribution of
wealth to allocate goods and services, it would be surprising indeed if,
over the long run, LULUs did not impose a disproportionate burden
upon the poor." '79 It is the market, she concludes, that may ultimately
lead the poor to "come to the nuisance," to move to neighborhoods
that host LULUs. 0
Market theories, however, are notoriously incomplete. As others
have argued persuasively, markets are social institutions shaped by vari-
ous levels of state and private control."1 The historical and present reality
of race discrimination inevitably, and not surprisingly, affects individual
preferences and mobility in the housing arena. 2 Been is careful not to
overlook its influence. As she notes, the existence of a LULU, in addi-
tion to attracting lower income residents and deterring higher income
households, ensures that "[t]he neighborhood also is likely to become
home to more people of color." 3 She acknowledges that the impact of
"[r]acial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing relegates peo-
ple of color (especially African-Americans) to the least desirable neigh-
borhoods, regardless of their income level."'  Moreover, even after a
neighborhood becomes predominantly composed of people of color,
Been recognizes that "racial discrimination in the promulgation and
enforcement of zoning and environmental protection laws, the provision
77. Id. (footnotes omitted). Notably, and ironically, a later empirical study performed by Been
failed to provide support for her "market dynamics" theory. See Been, supra note 59, at 27-29, 34.
But see infra note 89.
78. See Blais, supra note 69, at 93 (explaining that "[t]he market allocates according to ability
to pay; the more money one has, the more of any particular good-including a clean environment-
one can afford to purchase").
79. Been, supra note 74, at 1390 (emphasis added).
80. See id.; see also Lambert & Boerner, supra note 74, at 202.
81. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKErS AND SOCIAL JusTIcE (1997); Blais, supra
note 69, at 141; Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PuD. Ai'. 3, 10
("[P]references are shifting and endogenous rather than exogenous, and as a result are a function of
current information consumption patterns, legal rules and general social patterns.").
82. See Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107
HAv. L. REv. 1841 (1994) (arguing that housing and spacial segregation is not "natural," but rather
constructed through various public and private actions, including racial discrimination).
83. Been, supra note 74, at 1389.
84. Id.
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of municipal services, and the lending practices of banks, may cause
neighborhood quality to decline further" and that "[the] additional
decline... will induce those who can leave the neighborhood-the least
poor and those least subject to discrimination-to do so."85 She con-
cludes that, "[a]s long as the market discriminates on the basis of race, it
would be remarkable if LULUs did not eventually impose a dispropor-
tionate burden upon people of color."86
Been finds this scrutiny of the distributive paradigm of environ-
mental justice fatal. Critiquing the studies which establish the race and
class correlations, she concludes that "[b]y failing to address how
LULUs have affected the demographics of their host communities, the
current research has ignored the possibility that the correlation between
the location of LULUs and the socio-economic characteristics of neigh-
borhoods may be a function of aspects of our free market
system ... ." The implications of this failure, she believes, go right to
the heart of environmental justice research and its remedy. As she ex-
plains, "Both the justice of the distribution of LULUs and the remedy
85. Id. (footnotes omitted). See also DOUGLASS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 114 (1993). Massey and
Denton found that "race is the dominant organizing principle" for "housing and residential patterns."
Id. They conclude that:
[t]hrough a series of exclusionary tactics, realtors limit the likelihood of black entry into
white neighborhoods and channel black demand for housing into areas that are within or
near existing ghettos. White prejudice is such that when black entry into a neighborhood is
achieved, that area becomes unattractive to further white settlement and whites begin
departing at an accelerated pace. This segmentation of black and white housing demand is
encouraged by pervasive discrimination in the allocation of mortgages and home
improvement loans, which systematically channel money away from integrated areas.
Id. According to one study, among neighborhoods located within five miles of an established black
neighborhood, white population loss is extremely likely, and becomes virtually certain as the
percentage of blacks increase. This pattern holds true for suburbs as well as central cities. The
probability that a central city tract located within five miles of a black neighborhood would lose white
residents was .85 when its black percentage was 0%-5% black; and it rose to .92 when the black
percentage reached 30%-40%. See id. at 80.
86. Been, supra note 74, at 1389 (emphasis added).
87. Id. I am troubled by Been's use of market rhetoric, and in particular the language of the
"free market," to describe housing dynamics underlying distributive outcomes. Even while
acknowledging that racial prejudice infects decision-making processes in the housing market, her
rhetoric has the effect of expanding the domain of the "free market" to include discriminatory
practices. This would not be so problematic if free market analysis were not so connected to purely
economic relationships, which are presumed to be "natural." For instance, legal realists have
referred to the mystification of economic relationships as "natural," and as a function of legal
doctrine and legal reasoning. See e.g., Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 PoL. ScL. Q. 470 (1923). Hence, when Been opines that the free market or market
dynamics cause a particular distribution, it would be easy to attach a normative meaning-that such
dynamics are natural--to her essentially empirical analysis of post-siting housing dynamics. Although
I suspect that she does not intend such normative implications, see note 88 infra, I wish the terms used
to describe her empirical analysis did not carry such implications.
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for any injustice may differ if market dynamics play a significant role
in the distribution. 8
2. Empirical versus Normative Causation
Undoubtedly the "dynamics" of the housing market-broadly
construed to include discriminatory practices-can theoretically account
for some of the racially disparate environmental hazard distribution
patterns.89 As others have pointed out, there might be a number of de-
velopmental patterns, given the combination of poverty and racially dis-
criminatory practices, that would result in poor people of color either
moving to or becoming trapped in neighborhoods with a disproportion-
ate number of hazardous sources. 90 Determining the various factors that
88. Been, supra, note 74, at 1390. For instance, if the "fairness of the distribution becomes a
question about the fairness of our market economy;' there will be those who respond that the market
economy "is, overall, fairer than alternative schemes, and that the costs of regulating the market to
reduce the disproportionate burden outweigh the benefits of doing so," or "that those moving to a host
neighborhood are compensated through the market for the disproportionate burden they bear by
lower housing costs, and therefore that the situation is just." Ma. at 1391-92. On the other hand, even if
decision-makers agreed that it is unfair to allow post-siting market dynamics to create the
disproportionate environmental risk for the poor and/or people of color, "the remedy for that injustice
would have to be much more fundamental than the remedy for unjust siting decisions." Id. at 1392.
An effective remedy would require, instead, more fundamental reforms, such as:
stricter enforcement of laws against housing discrimination, more serious efforts to achieve
residential integration, changes in the processes of siting low and moderate income hous-
ing, changes in programs designed to aid the poor in securing decent housing, greater
regulatory protection for those neighborhoods that are chosen to host LULUs, and changes
in production and consumption processes to reduce the number of LULUs needed.
Id.
89. Notably, there is inconclusive empirical support to date for the "market dynamics"
explanation for racial or economic disparities in the distribution of hazardous waste facilities. See,
e.g., Been, supra note 59, at 8, 33 (finding that the areas surrounding commercial hazardous waste
treatment facilities currently are populated disproportionately by lower-income Hispanics; and
finding that there is no evidence to support her "market dynamics theory"-that these communities
became poorer or increased in minority population after the waste facilities were sited); Been, supra
note 74, at 1398-1400 (finding that the Southeastern waste sites studied by the U.S. General
Accounting Office in 1983 were all in communities that originally had both high levels of poverty and
predominantly African-American populations; and finding that these communities did not become
poorer nor did the percentage of African-Americans in the communities increase in the period after
the facility was sited). But see id. at 1400-06 (finding that ten Houston waste sites studied in 1983 by
Professor Robert Bullard were originally sited in disproportionately African-American communities,
but they did not originally have disproportionately lower incomes; however, finding that the
percentages of African-Americans rose and incomes fell after the solid waste facilities were sited);
Lambert & Boerner, supra note 74, at 206-07 (finding that "[b]etween 1970 and 1990, concentrations
of poor and minority individuals increased disproportionately around the St. Louis area's CERCLA
[Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act] sites, TSDFs [treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities], and nonhazardous landfills and incinerators"); Douglas Anderson et
al., supra note 59, at 135 (finding evidence of economic decline in communities with commercial
hazardous waste facilities, but no evidence of white flight from those neighborhoods after the siting
of such facilities).
90. For instance, communities where poor minorities now live may have originally been the
homes of whites who "worked in the facilities that generate toxic emissions." Regina Austin &
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contribute to the distributive outcomes is indeed an important episte-
mological question.
The chicken or egg quandary posed by commentators does not,
however, answer the more fundamental inquiry posed by environmental
justice research. The question underlying environmental justice research
is normative. It asks, "What do we mean when we call an outcome racist
or evidence of injustice?"'" The chicken or egg inquiry posed by com-
mentators such as Been is empirical. It asks, "Which came first: the
waste facilities or the poor people of color?"'  Answering the second
question does not necessarily answer the first, that is, the normative
claim embedded in environmental justice research is not answered sim-
ply by a descriptive analysis of forces underlying a particular distribu-
tional pattern.93 The post-siting market dynamics analysis is certainly
useful in determining whether it is more descriptively correct to attribute
environmental disparities to the siting process or other forces outside of
that process. However, even if one could establish that market dynamics,
and not the siting process, produce racially disparate outcomes, this
would not tell us whether such market forces are just or fair. Uncovering
the patterns and processes underlying the distributive outcomes is an
important first step; a normative evaluation of these outcomes is the next
crucial step.
Michael Schill, Black Brown, Red & Poisoned, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 53. In
those communities, the housing and industry may have "sprang up roughly simultaneously" and whites
may have "vacated the housing (but not necessarily the jobs) for better shelter as their socioeconomic
status improved." Id. at 54. In turn, poorer Latinos and African-Americans "who enjoy much less
residential mobility" may have taken their place. Id. In another pattern, housing for African-
Americans and Latinos may have been built in the vicinity of existing industrial operations because
"the land was cheap and the people were poor." Id. In still another pattern, "sources of toxic
pollution may have been placed in existing minority communities." Id. at 54.
91. See Foster, supra note 70, at 731.
92. Been's project is admittedly empirical. She wants only to "address the gaps in the research"
establishing racially disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards. Doing so, she hopes, will
demonstrate "why an empirical understanding of the role of market dynamics play in the distribution
is necessary" to reach normative conclusions "about the fairness of the existing distribution of
LULUs and to fashion an effective remedy for any unfairness in that distribution." Been, supra note
74, at 1386. She does not, however, explicitly reach any normative conclusions about whether these
market dynamics render the distributional outcomes racist or suggest evidence of injustice. See also
Lambert and Boemer, supra note 74, at 206, 212 (finding that their analysis supports the theory that
"minority and poor [individuals] voluntarily move into areas surrounding industrial and waste sites" in
St. Louis, but cautioning that "the conclusions drawn from this study may provide an incomplete
picture of environmental justice," and "other forms of racial discrimination may have been a factor
influencing the subsequent migration of these residents to communities hosting polluting facilities.").
93. I am indebted to Angela Harris for this insight. Economists and others have noted the
limitations of economic analysis and the need to make a distinction between descriptive and
normative analysis. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMINo LAw 1-29 (1995) (arguing
that empirical reality should inform normative theories and expressing the limitations of economic
analysis to provide normative answers); Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic
Theory of Law, 62 MIN. L. REv. 1015, 1040 (1978) (noting how economic analysis "can carelessly
slip from an approximate empirical 'Is' to a definite ideal 'Must or Ought to Be').
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As I have argued elsewhere, if existing racially discriminatory
processes in the housing market, for instance, contribute to the distribu-
tion of environmental hazards, then it is entirely appropriate to call such
outcomes unjust, and even racist.' Many toxic waste sites are located in
racially segregated, and impoverished communities, such as Chester.95
Racially discriminatory processes, as many have noted, play a determi-
native role in constructing segregated and impoverished neighbor-
hoods.9 6 The combination of white flight and limited residential choices,
likely due to a combination of poverty and housing discrimination,
along with falling property values, has left poor people of color essen-
tially trapped in environmentally subordinate neighborhoods. So long
as the distribution of environmental hazards are produced, even in part,
by a discriminatory social structure, environmental injustice exists.'I
3. Evaluating Current Siting Processes
The preceding empirical and normative assessment of post-siting
market dynamics is still an incomplete causal account of environmental
injustice in communities such as Chester. Market dynamics may explain
how Chester became a predominantly poor community of color after
the influx of industry and its manufacturing base. Post-siting market
dynamics does not explain the current siting pattern in Chester.
94. Foster, supra note 70, at 735-38; see also Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Envi-
ronmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L REV. 839, 839 (1992) (explaining that "the term racism draws its
contemporary moral strength by being clearly identified with the history of the structural oppression
of African-Americans and other people of color in this society").
95. See Been, supra note 59, at 30 (noting that a comparison of the means of demographic
variables for 544 tracts hosting active commercial waste sites in 1994 reveals that "[h]ost tracts have
a much less educated population[,] ... higher levels of unemployment, lower levels of employment in
the professional occupations, higher levels of employment in manufacturing occupations," and are
disproportionately Hispanic); see also GOLDMAN & FTroN, supra note 59, at i (finding that, in 1993,
people of color were 47% more likely than whites to live near a commercial hazardous waste
facility).
96. See Been, supra note 88; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 85; Ford, supra note 82.
97. Presumably, commentators like Been would agree with this normative analysis. Even though
Been's overall analysis seems to be free of normative judgment, instead merely raising empirical
problems with the research, at one point her analysis does reveal that "[i]f the market forces at issue
are based upon discrimination, i.e., if host neighborhoods became predominantly minority after the
LULU was sited because racial discrimination in the housing market relegated people of color to
those neighborhoods, siting practices might have to change to account for persistent discrimination in
the housing market." Been, supra note 74, at 1391, n.30 (comparing United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1531-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992)
(rejecting the argument that educational decision-making processes must change to account for
housing market discrimination partly responsible for reproducing racially segregated schools).
98. See CERRELL ASSOCIATES, INC., POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FACING WASTE-To-Energy
CONVERSION PLANT SITING 65 (1984) (consulting report prepared for California Waste
Management Board) ("[T]he people most likely to express opposition ... to a project [are] residents
in the vicinity, liberal, and higher educated persons"); see also Lois Marie Gibbs & Brian Lipsett, The
Siting Game: A NIMBY Primer, 8 F. APPLIED REs. & PuB. POL'y 36, 37 (1993) (describing siting
efforts in North Carolina that target politically weak communities).
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Examining the structured inequalities resulting from market dynamics
in communities such as Chester does, however, help one understand and
evaluate current siting processes within their social context.
Although the siting process does not produce the structured ine-
qualities in communities such as Chester, it is heavily dependent upon
them. Conventional industry wisdom counsels private companies to tar-
get sites that are in neighborhoods "least likely to express opposi-
tion"-poorly educated and lower socioeconomic neighborhoods with
little if any commercial activity. 98 Communities such as Chester possess
many of these characteristics. This is due in part to historical zoning
practices and their segregative effects. 9 This racialization of space"reaches to the societal processes in which people participate and to the
structures and institutions that people produce."" ° Residential location,
for instance, is seen as an indication of the attitudes, values, and behav-
ioral inclinations of the types of people who are assumed to live there. 0'
Moreover, segregation has intense political and economic consequences,
particularly for poor African Americans and Latinos living in inner-
cities."ea Segregated communities are not only geographically isolated,
99. For instance, Yale Rabin describes one type of zoning practice-expulsive zoning-as
contributing to the maintenance of racially segregative communities:
The record, while admittedly fragmentary, indicates that in the years following the
[Supreme] Court's rejection of racial zoning in 1917 and continuing through the thirties, and
perhaps much later, a number of cities-mainly, but not exclusively, in the South-zoned
some low-income residential areas occupied mainly, but not exclusively, by blacks for
industrial or commercial use. These practices were sometimes carried out even in
neighborhoods of single-family detached homes, thus undermining the quality of the very
types of neighborhood which zoning ostensibly was intended to protect. To the extent that
these practices were effective--that is, to the extent that residential uses were replaced by
industrial or commercial uses, residents were displaced. Therefore, the term expulsive
zoning. Because it appears that such areas were mainly black, and because whites who may
have been similarly displaced were not subject to racially determined limitations in seeking
alternative housing, the adverse impacts of expulsive zoning on blacks were far more
severe and included, in addition to accelerated blight, increases in overcrowding and racial
segregation.
Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 101-02 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989)
(emphasis in original); see also John C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right
to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L REV. 739 (1993) (discussing
historical zoning practices and their present-day segregative effects).
100. John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a Stone of
Hope from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L REV. 1233, 1235 (1995); see also Ford, supra note
82, at 1852 ("[A]lthough political space seems to be the inert context in which individuals make
rational choices, it is in fact a controlling structure in which seemingly innocuous actions lead to
racially detrimental consequences.").
101. See Susan J. Smith, Residential Segregation and the Politics of Racialization, in RACISM, THE
CITY AND THE STATE 128, 133 (Malcolm Cross & Michael Keith eds., 1993).
102. Although Massey and Denton describe poor blacks as "hyper segregated"-unlikely to
have any direct contact with the larger society unless they work outside of their neighborhoods-
other groups also experienced varying degrees of segregation. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
85, at 74, 113-14 (comparing the segregation of Caribbean Latinos with blacks and concluding that
the average level of segregation increases steadily as one moves from being identified as white
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but socially and culturally isolated. This isolation, in turn, leads to
economic and political marginalization.r 3 Accordingly, the political
process rarely takes the concerns of such communities seriously, and
decision-makers often ignore them altogether."°
The hazardous waste siting process begins with the private sector
choosing an appropriate site for the location of a proposed facility. Be-
cause the proposed location of a hazardous waste facility near, particu-
larly, a white, upper-socioeconomic neighborhood often engenders
strong public opposition, there is a limited supply of land on which to
site such facilities.105 Inevitably, the siting process focuses on industrial
or rural communities, many of which, like Chester, have predominantly
minority populations.'0 These areas are attractive to industries seeking
Hispanics, to mixed-race Hispanics, to black Hispanics--the latter have an "index" of segregation
comparable to that of African-Americans).
103. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE Naw
URBAN POOR 51-86 (1996) (finding that social isolation deprives inner-city residents not only of
conventional role models but also of the social resources provided by mainstream social networks that
facilitate social and economic advancement in a modem industrial society).
104. As one commentator has remarked:
The organization of space is often critical in determining what is politically possible in the
U.S. because so many aspects of American politics and policy are tied to geographical
boundaries. The migration of southern blacks to northern cities from the 1920s on, but
especially during the 1950s with the mechanization of southern agriculture, left blacks
concentrated within central cities at a time when many whites were leaving the city for
newly constructed, federally subsidized suburbs. This geographic separation of blacks has
important political consequences: it transforms the problems of living in cities into "black"
problems, making it easier for politicians to solve urban problems at the expense of poor
black residents. They, in fact, become the problem as cities become polarized between the
rich and the poor. This geo-political separation exacerbates the disconnection of the black
poor from whites, as the fate of the city becomes not a shared interest, but part of a battle
over how resources will be distributed across political boundaries.
Margaret Weir, From Equal Opportunity to "The New Social Contract": Race and the Politics of the
American Underclass, in RACISM, THE CITY AND THE STATE, supra note 101, at 104; see also
WILSON, supra note 103, at 185-86. Wilson notes:
The growing suburbanization of the population influences the extent to which national
politicians will support increased federal aid to large cities and the poor .... [W]e can
associate the sharp drop in federal support for basic urban programs since 1980 with the
declining political influence of cities and the rising influence of electoral coalitions in the
suburbs.
Id.
105. Industry considers public opposition, and often direct protest, to be the "greatest single
obstacle to the successful siting of' hazardous facilities, with middle- and upper-level socioeconomic
groups possessing greater resources to effectuate their opposition. CERRELL ASSOCIATES, supra note
98, at 64; see also Gibbs & Lipsett, supra note 98, at 43 (counseling that "middle and higher
socioeconomic strata neighborhoods should not fall within the one-mile and five-mile radius of the
proposed site"); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L REv. 787, 806 (1993) (noting that few proposals survive
public review that often accompanies the announcement of the recommended siting of a hazardous
waste facility).
106. Robert Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities, in RACE AND THE
INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 85-86, 90-91 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992)
(noting that when the middle- and upper-income neighborhoods defeat proposed hazardous waste
sites, the siting effort shifts toward more historically powerless neighborhoods, such as poor minority
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to reduce the cost of doing business because land values are lower in
heavily industrial and rural communities. 7 Furthermore, these commu-
nities are presumed to pose little threat of political resistance due to their
subordinate socioeconomic, and often racial, status. 108
The state both mediates and legitimizes the dependence of private
decision-makers on structural inequalities in choosing facility sites.
Even though private decision-makers must seek permits from state
agencies, there are often no formal criteria which take into account the
siting processes' reliance on structural inequalities; 1 9 too often state
agencies passively acquiesce to industry siting decisions."0 Aside from
neighborhoods). Certain neighborhoods have traditionally provided the location for industrial land
uses. Zoning practices in the early part of the century routinely zoned many African-American
communities as industrial and white areas as residential. See Rabin, supra note 99, at 101-02 (finding
that expulsive zoning practices have been relatively commonplace in black residential areas,
permitting the intrusion of disruptive compatible uses into those areas and generally undermining the
character, quality, and stability of black residential areas). "Such patterns, once established, are
difficulty to alter. LULUs result in depressed residential property values which, in turn, reduce the
municipal tax base and discourage other upscale development which would help boost property
values." Jason Wilson, Environmental Inequity: Which Came First, Poverty or Pollution?, NJ. REP.,
MarJApr. 1997, at 40.
Moreover, in certain geographic regions, the rural nature of a community becomes a surrogate
for poor minority communities. For example, Conner Bailey and Charles E. Faupel, in a discussion of
the nation's largest hazardous waste landfill in Emelle, Alabama, describe why it may have been
chosen as a site:
A sparse population often is a good indicator of poverty. In the context of Alabama, and the
South generally, the population of poor and sparsely populated rural counties is likely to be
mostly black. It follows that criteria for siting hazardous waste facilities which include
density of population will have the effect of targeting rural black communities that have
high rates of poverty .... Communities which fit this description are [also] likely to be
politically marginal at the state and federal levels.
Conner Bailey & Charles E. Faupel, Environmentalism and Civil Rights in Sumter County, Alabama, in
RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra; at 150; cf. GERRARD, supra note
44, at 90 (noting that "[miost of the anecdotes and much of the data concerning discriminatory siting
come from the southeastern United States... [and that] is a region where, for obvious historical
reasons, rural areas have large black populations; in the northeast, where the rural areas are mostly
white, most proposed sites have been in white areas").
107. See GERRARD, supra note 44, at 47; Mohai & Bryant, supra note 52, at 24.
108. See CERRtLL ASSOCIATES, supra note 97, at 5 (noting report designed to assist in selecting a
site that offers the least amount of "political resistance"); id. at 65 (noting that "older, conservative,
and lower socioeconomic neighborhoods" are least likely to resist sitings).
109. See infra note 113.
110. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. States have taken vastly different approaches to
the siting of these facilities, but most of the approaches cast the state in a passive role in the siting
process:
Siting statutes vary from the extremely passive to the strongly active. The passive approach
leaves it to the private sector to initiate proposals for new facilities, and local governments
retain significant power to approve or deny proposals. In the active approach, the state
develops a state-wide management plan, initiates the siting process by identifying locations
suitable for a facility and actively soliciting private sector participation, and preempts all
local authority .... Some states went so far as to mandate that a facility must be sited; a few
were willing to own and operate a state facility. Overall, surveys indicate that strong
initiative is "a minority approach to siting" and that most states opted for the more passive
end of the spectrum. "Generally, states appear to prefer the role of guardian to the siting
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technical siting criteria and lax public notice requirements,"' the per-
mitting decision is almost entirely in the discretion of state administra-
tive agencies."' Unfortunately, state agencies determine a proposed
facility's impact on the community in a vacuum, rarely looking beyond
the geological and environmental characteristics of the proposed site."'
Rarely is there any formal assessment of the demographics, health
problems, quality of life and infrastructure of the surrounding commu-
nity, or the synergistic environmental or health effects of other facilities
in the area."4 When the siting process is neutral toward these structural
inequalities it, in effect, perpetuates the injustice of the current social
structure."5 The end result of environmental decision-making processes,
particularly in communities such as Chester, is not that people "come to
the hazard," but rather that "the hazard comes to them."" 6
C. The Many Faces of Injustice
An overwhelming focus on unequal distribution as injustice also
implies that redistribution alone could achieve environmental justice.
Environmental justice is often regarded as the equitable distribution of
process while allowing the private sector to set the pace and initiate specific siting
proposals."
ANDREW SZASZ, ECOPOPULISM: Toxic WASTE AND THE MOVEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
JusTicE 183 n.26 (1994) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
111. For instance, in Chester, the site for the Westinghouse incinerator was chosen without any
input from residents opposed to the siting, few of whom even heard about the single public hearing.
See also infra Part IV B (discussing public comment and notice requirements in Pennsylvania).
112. See Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URD. U.
431,452-53 (1994).
113. See A. Dan Tarlock, State versus Local Control of Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Who
Decides in Whose Backyard?, in RESOLVING LOCATIONAL CONFLIcT 137, 150-51 (Robert W. Lake
ed., 1987). However, some states do mandate that agencies consider so-called "nontechnical"
criteria, such as "objections submitted by the public" (Michigan) or "community perceptions and
other ... costs" (Kentucky). Id. at 150. The question remains whether these so-called "soft" criteria
are given the same, or similar, weight as technical criteria, or even taken seriously, in the ultimate
decision. See Part V for further discussion of the efficacy of these criteria in siting decisions.
114. State agencies are often free to ignore and override such concerns, even when expressed
by local officials. In Pennsylvania, the State may refuse to follow a local government's
recommendation to deny a facility permit, but if it does, a "written justification" must accompany the
decision. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6018.504 (West 1993); see also supra Part I.C and infra
Part IM.D. (noting opposition from both Chester residents and the city council to the recently
permitted SRS facility); see also GERRARD, supra note 44, at 124 (noting that 24 of the 37 existing
state siting statutes do contain preemption provisions, but mostly in the weaker form of state override
authority).
115. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 3-4 ("[W]hen the state chooses 'status quo neutrality,' in
taking existing social practices and distributions as its baseline for being neutral toward public and
private actors, it produces injustice."); see also Ford, supra note 82, at 1852 (making similar point in
the context of housing segregation).
116. Kathy S. Northern, Battery and Beyond: Tort Law Response to Environmental Racism,
21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 485,523 (1997).
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environmental risks and benefits."7 It also encompasses the concept of
environmental equity, which holds that all populations should bear a fair
proportion of environmental contamination and health risks."' These
conceptions of environmental justice, again heavily reliant upon a dis-
tributive paradigm, are too monolithic. Injustice manifests itself in dif-
ferent ways for different social groups and can be seen and measured
along a number of axes."9 Conceptualizing social harm only in dis-
tributive terms leaves different measures of injustice unnoticed and un-
heeded.20
For instance, consider Native Americans who in some instances
have "chosen" to develop hazardous waste facilities on their land. Their
decisions to do so have attracted both internal and external controversy.
Internal controversies often involve the complex relationship between
tribal members and their representative tribal councils, who often make
these decisions in tandem with either the federal government or private
developers.' 2' External controversies often involve neighboring
117. For example, a proposed "Environmental Justice Act" took exactly this approach to
remedying the problem. That Act would have prevented the siting of toxic chemical facilities in
environmental "high impact areas" if it could be demonstrated that adverse health consequence have
resulted from the level of toxic emissions in those areas as compared to other areas. See H.R. 5326,
102d Cong. (1992). See also, Part V A infra (discussing similar state legislation). To be sure, equal
distribution is not all that environmental justice entails. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Decision-Making,
in THE FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 1, at 3-28 (setting out the elements of
environmental justice, including procedural equity, social equity, and geographic equity in
environmental decision-making). While theoretical concepts and models of environmental (in)justice
are multi-faceted, highlighting the empirical basis of environmental injustice and the emphasis on
regulating distribution tends to overshadow the other elements of this phenomenon.
118. See 1 Environmental Equity Workgroup, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
PuB. No. EPA 230-R-92-008, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIEs,
WORKGROUP REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR 1 (1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY];
2 ENVIRONMENTAL EqurrY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PuB. No.
EPA 230-R-92-008A, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNrrIEs,
SUPPORTING DOCUMENT (1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY SUPPORTING DOCUMENT].
119. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 3, at 39-65 (describing five conditions of oppression-
exploitation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, violence, and marginalization-and arguing that the
existence of any one of the five is sufficient to call a group "oppressed"). For example, women may
be subject to four oppressive conditions: exploitation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and
violence; white gay men may be subject to only two of them: cultural imperialism and violence; while
African Americans and Latinos may be subject to all five forms of oppression. See it See also
PULrDo, supra note 4, at 152 (noting that "racism experienced by different segments of the
population may vary considerably, depending not only on one's gender, 'race,' and class, but also the
different meanings associated with these identities at any given moment").
120. PULIDO, supra note 4, at 152 (noting that "it is entirely plausible that the racism at work in
the placement of an incinerator in a black, rural community is different from the racism which causes
Latinos to face severe occupational hazards").
121. For example, a well known controversy involves the Mescalero Apache and their decision
to build a temporary nuclear waste storage facility on the Mescalero reservation in New Mexico. The
project would allow approximately thirty utilities to place spent-fuel rods from commercial nuclear
power plants in large casks and ship them to an above-ground storage facility on the reservation. The
casks would have remained there for forty years or more, depending on whether or when the United
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communities or environmental groups claiming that the proposed siting
will threaten natural resources or public health.' Indisputably, com-
mercial waste vendors are attracted to Native American communities
because they are impoverished and often desperately in need of
States Department of Energy builds a permanent national repository for the wastes, which remain
dangerously radioactive for tens of thousands of years. Tom Meersman, Mescaleros' OK of Nuclear
Waste Storage Site Pits Tribe against N. Mexico Officials, MINNEAPOLIS STAR Tum., Mar. 11, 1995,
at lA.
The proposed development was intensely opposed by tribal members, state officials, and other
concerned citizens. Tribal officials estimated, however, that over the forty years it proposed to care
for the waste, the fees would bring the tribe $250 million in wages, lease payments, and other
economic benefits. So confident was Wendell Chino, the president of the Mescalero Apaches, that he
put the proposal to a vote by the entire tribe in January 1995. Turning out in record numbers, tribal
members voted 490 to 362 against building the dump. See id But, after a controversial petition drive
headed by the reservation's housing director, the tribal council held a second ballot in March 1995, in
which the tribe, again turning out in record numbers, voted 593 to 372 in favor of the facility.
Because the housing director's office provides housing to 60% of the tribe's members, many opposed
to the project claimed that residents may have felt intimidated into signing the petition. See id. In
addition, opponents charged that tribal members were "deluged with false assurances about the
safety" of the waste storage plant and "promised $2,000 cash awards." Id. Tribal officials, on the
other hand, blamed outside interference from "environmentalists" and other "anti-tribal" groups, as
well as a misunderstanding of the benefits to be gained by the project, as an explanation for the first
vote rejecting the plan. Id.
In April 1996, the project was suspended after negotiations between the utilities and tribal
leaders failed. In 1997, the utilities signed an agreement with the Skull Valley Band of Goshute in
Utah to lease a small portion of the tribe's reservation for the nuclear waste site. See George
Johnson, Nuclear Waste Dump Gets Tribe's Approval in Re-Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at A6;
George Johnson, Tribal Democracy; Apaches Spurn a Chance to Run a Nuclear Dump, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 1995, at D2; Tom Meersman, NSP Nuclear Waste May Be Utah-Bound; Deal with Tribe Is
under Fire, MINNEAPOLIS STAR Tin., Jan. 9, 1997, at 1B; Tom Meersman, NSP's Talks on Nuclear
Waste Break O; Storage Sought in New Mexico, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TuB., Apr. 19, 1996, at 8A.
122. An example of this type of conflict is the controversy surrounding the California Tribe of
the Campo Band of Mission Indians' commercial solid waste and recycling facility project. Having
gained a thorough understanding of the economic and environmental issues that might arise, the Band
decided to proceed with the project. Relying on federal regulations prohibiting discriminatory effects
in the administration of federally subsidized environmental programs, see supra note 50, the tribe was
able to develop its own waste codes and regulations that prohibited the processing and disposal of any
hazardous waste within the reservation. The tribe also set up its own agency, the Campo
Environmental Protection Agency (CEPA). The tribe charged CEPA with developing a solid waste
management plan for the reservation, which would include codes and detailed regulations CEPA
would be responsible for enforcing. Their codes not only complied with minimum federal standards,
but were more stringent than California standards. As such, CEPA will have the most stringent and
aggressive environmental program in California. See Palma Repole, One Tribe's Development of a
Commercial Waste Facility in the Wake of Environmental Racism, 1 GREATER N. CENTRAL NAT.
RESouRcEs J. 209, 225-41 (1996).
Neighboring state residents opposed and tried to stop the Campo project for fear it would
threaten their only groundwater aquifer. This objection was largely overcome by a decision of
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) that both recognized the potential problem for groundwater
monitoring and concluded that an intensive system of monitoring wells could remedy the deficiency
and provide adequate protection. The lease to the developer was approved on this basis, despite
intense opposition, which included an unsuccessful attempt by neighboring communities and the
County of San Diego to enjoin the Secretary of Interior's decision. See id
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economic resources." Tribal governments sometimes view these proj-
ects as providing tribal economic self-sufficiency, including full em-
ployment of tribal members and investment capital for future projects. 24
Moreover, as some have noted, despite situations of desperate poverty,
tribal governments, because of the activism of tribal members, have pru-
dently rejected proposals for environmentally unsound sites on their
reservations.'25
Native-American advocates resist efforts to force their struggles
into a narrow distributive paradigm of environmental racism. Instead of
measuring environmental injustice according to how many waste sites
exist on tribal lands, some Native Americans have focused on their
tribes' ability to exercise their unique sovereignty. 26 This sovereignty
includes the right to make decisions and have them respected, which
means that "the environmental community must come to understand
that not all such facilities are unwanted by the host community and that,
in those cases where a community wishes to have such a facility, its deci-
sion is to be respected."'27
123. Moreover, waste companies are capitalizing on the confusion surrounding environmental
regulatory authority on Indian lands. State law does not apply to Indian lands if it is preempted by
federal law or its imposition would unduly interfere with the tribe's ability to regulate and govern its
own affairs. See id. at 216-17. This means that waste projects on Indian lands effectively escape the
more stringent environmental regulations imposed under state law, making them especially attractive
sites for companies who wish to save the extra cost of compliance. See id. To complicate matters
further, the original federal environmental statutes failed to recognize tribes as sovereign entities, the
equivalent of states, for purposes of the Acts. See id. While in the 1980s most of the statutes were
later amended to include tribes, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which sets
minimum guidelines and standards for the disposal of hazardous and solid wastes, has yet to be
revised. Consequently, there is currently no provision for solid waste regulation on Indian lands that
do not exercise independent means and regulate themselves. See id. at 218-19; see also Backcountry
Against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147 (1996) (holding that Native-American tribes are not states
under RCRA).
124. See Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One Tribe's
Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country,
63 U. CoLo. L REv. 933, 941 (1992) (describing use of the investment capital from the Campo
Project to fund badly needed services on the reservation, provide full scholarships for any tribal
member admitted to college, refurbish all existing tribal facilities and constructing new ones, establish
a tribal housing authority, construct new homes for every family now living in substandard housing,
and provide income supplements to each tribal member).
125. While tribal governments across the U.S. have received many proposals from waste
companies, only a handful remained under serious consideration as of 1992. See id. at 934.
126. As one Native American tribal member explains:
The ability of tribal governments to exercise sovereign powers to determine social,
economic and scientific policy is as fundamental as the exercise of cultural and religious
freedom. A definition of environmental justice which applies to tribes must go beyond the
standard definition which calls for 'equal protection from environmental and health hazards
across racial, class and cultural groups.' Tribes themselves must develop their own policies
which are rooted in the principle that tribes have the right to excise sovereignty and
determine policy on tribal lands.
Kimberly TallBear, Environmental Justice: Tribes Take a Stand on Nuclear Waste Storage, CoLoRs,
Fall 1996, at 11, 13; see also Repole, supra note 122, at 240-41.
127. Gover & Walker, supra note 124, at 933.
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Environmental racism manifests itself quite differently in the case
of Native Americans, reflecting a particular racial ideology rather than
measurable acts of discrimination. When tribal sovereignty is not re-
spected, Native-American groups often find themselves fighting racial
paternalism and cultural imperialism.' Tribes are faced with having to
prove, to both environmentalists and politicians alike, that they are com-
petent enough to manage their land and natural resources in a way that
removes the incentive for abusive waste projects and preserves the integ-
rity of tribal sovereignty.'29 As the counsel to the Campo Band of
Mission Indians in their battle to develop a tribal waste project explains,
the "major issue" facing tribes in this context is not "environmental,"
but instead one of "power and racism." He criticizes the mainstream
environmental community for its assumption that "if an Indian com-
munity decides to accept such a project, it either does not understand
the potential consequences or has been bamboozled by an unprincipled
waste company." This assumption is "clearly" a "racist" one; it im-
plies "that Indians lack the intelligence to balance and protect ade-
quately their own economic and environmental interests." Moreover, it
is "the same assumption that guided the federal policies that very nearly
eradicated Indian people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies." As such, it is "environmental racism" and ultimately "every
bit as destructive as the open hostility to Indian people that we experi-
ence in many parts of this country. '' 1r°
Another type of opposition to a tribe's decision to locate a waste
facility on their land is equally problematic. Some object that tribes'"spiritual view" and values are incompatible with the economic devel-
opment promised by a potential facility. Addressing one environmen-
talist's suggestion that Tribes are being "forced" to "exchange the
spiritual view of their once pristine environment for a commercial
one,"'' a Native-American activist posited that not only are Indian Res-
ervations "situated on the least desirable land in the nation," but the
128. See supra note 119.
129. In fact, far from the perception that the waste industry is "beating a path to the tribal door,"
the bigger problem on Native lands is the unauthorized and illegal dumping occurring on reservations.
See Gover & Walker, supra note 124, at 934 ("For most Indian communities the problem of open
dumping on tribal lands is of much greater concern than the remote prospect that a commercial waste
disposal facility may be sited on a reservation").
130. Id. at 942-43.
131. Roger R. Martella, Jr., "Not in My State's Indian Reservation"-A Legislative Fix to Close
an Environmental Law Loophole, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1863, 1864-65 (1994) (noting also that "this shift
from nurturing nature to exploiting the environment on a growing number of reservations results
largely from a legal loophole that permits non-natives to pollute inside Indian country in ways they
could not elsewhere"); see also Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 427 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the City of Albuquerque's arguments against the EPA's approval of Tribe's more stringent water
quality standards includes claim that the "water quality criteria approved by the EPA fail to protect
water used under the [tribe's religious] ceremonial use standard").
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land "is usually so barren that farming is impossible and ranching ave-
nues are pitiful."'32 As such, the tribe's "spiritual view" has "often
been already shattered by white development of what was once their tra-
ditional domain.' ' 3 To some Native Americans, this "spiritual incom-
patibility" objection reflects either a "nostalgic need to maintain a
romantic[] fiction about Indians and their relationship with 'Mother
Earth"' or "a prevailing racist attitude that Indian people have no busi-
ness developing the natural resources of their land without the say-so of
the non-Indian community."' 34
The unique characteristics of Native-American environmental
struggles illustrate the epistemological inadequacies of a distributive
paradigm of environmental injustice. A distributive notion of environ-
mental injustice does not capture the cultural imperialism and paternal-
ism that Native Americans endure. As one Native-American activist
explains, "For many poor, but competent Tribes, the choice to build a
waste facility is the lesser of two evils. Advocates of Tribal rights would
argue that the insidious presence of 'environmental racism' is inherent
in the choosing, not in the choice."' 35
I
A CLOSER LOOK:
EVALUATING (IN)JUSTICE AT THE GRASSROOTS LEVEL
In the preceding Part, I argued that the failure to articulate the
causal structure of distributive outcomes has imperiled our full under-
standing of environmental racism or injustice. I also suggested that dis-
tributive environmental outcomes are produced by, and within, a system
of social relations and social structure. Only by understanding the sys-
tem of social relations and structure in which environmental distribu-
tions take place can we begin to understand the phenomenon of
environmental injustice, and what environmental justice would entail.
This Part will situate the role of grassroots struggles in this epistemo-
logical project before returning to a more detailed account of the
Chester experience.
Grassroots struggles are a window into the social relations and
processes underlying distributive outcomes. To be sure, they are not the
only window into this process. Importantly, however, grassroots ac-
counts tell a crucial narrative that "reveals the particular experiences of
those in social locations, experiences that cannot be shared by those
situated differently but that they must understand in order to do justice
132. Repole, supra note 122, at 221.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 221-22.
135. Id. at 241.
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to the others."'36 As I have indicated earlier, many books on the subject
illustrate that narratives of disaffected communities are important to our
understanding of the normative content of claims of injustice in envi-
ronmental decision-making. 3 7 As importantly, grassroots struggles can
help policy-makers understand the way in which individuals in disaf-
fected communities experience the very social and structural constraints
upon which the siting process relies. Such an understanding, one hopes,
will help reconceptualize grassroots efforts as more than mere attempts
to disrupt the decisions of private corporations and state agencies.
Rather, grassroots struggles are a crucial arena of restructuring social
relations in systems of localized environmental decision-making.
An important component in the environmental justice debate con-
cerns the relative power and agency of the actors involved. Grassroots
struggles frequently pit low-income and/or minority communities
against the facility owners and state environmental agencies. By virtue
of their social status, the communities often appear vulnerable to more
powerful interests in the decision-making process.' On the other hand,
some commentators believe that citizens in overburdened communities
possess enough power to choose freely whether to host a hazardous
waste facility or to employ "exit" as a response to the siting of a locally
unwanted land use.'39 In addition, recent books are replete with stories
that portray overburdened communities as powerful enough to success-
fully defeat siting efforts by private and public interests."4
The competing views, and realities, of power and agency, in grass-
roots environmental justice struggles raise some important questions.
How can these communities be both powerless and vulnerable to un-
wanted sitings, yet powerful enough to stop these sitings? If these com-
munities are successful in fighting off unwanted uses, then where is the
136. Iris M. Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIF'ERENCE 120, 131 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
137. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Bullard, supra note 106, at 82, 85 (arguing that the NIMBY syndrome has resulted
in private industries shifting their siting efforts to "poor, powerless, minority communities" which "do
not have resources, or [government and industry] contacts, to initiate or sustain the proactive
behavior found in more affluent communities"); Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor,
and Poisoned, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 55 ("People of color in the United States
have traditionally had less clout with which to check legislative and executive abuse or to challenge
regulatory laxity. Private corporations, moreover, can have a powerful effect on the behavior of
public officials. Poor minority people wind up the losers to them both.").
"NIMBY" stands for Not In My Backyard. See generally KENT F. PORTNEY, SITING
HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT FACILITIES: THE NIMBY SYNDROME 10-14 (1991).
139. See, e.g., Blais, supra note 69, at 126 ("Ultimately, many members of the host community
may express their preferences concerning residential proximity to environmentally sensitive land uses
with their feet."). Of course, social processes like racial discrimination limit the choices, and mobility,
of individuals in these communities. See Been, supra note 74, at 1389-90.
140. See supra note 1.
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need for policy reforms? Why not let this new version of "NIMBYism"
drive the market for distributing land uses, as it has up to now? If com-
munities such as Chester have enough power to stop unwanted sitings,
why the need for policy reforms to achieve environmental justice?
Grassroots struggles, such as that in Chester, reveal a much more
complex view of agency'41 and power relations than has been generally
offered in the context of the environmental justice debate. For many
involved in the struggle for environmental justice in disadvantaged
communities, agency is neither transcendent42 nor nonexistent.43 The
fact that communities such as Chester are both vulnerable to toxic as-
sault and, simultaneously, are successful in stopping that assault suggests
a paradoxical combination of socially oppressive constraints and self-
determining capacities.
Feminist scholars have recently articulated a view of power and
agency, applicable to grassroots environmental justice struggles, which
goes beyond the traditional dominant-subordinate model. Collective
resistance in communities such as Chester, amidst social and structural
141. My use of the term "agency" in the context of this Section mirrors its use in recent feminist
literature. Like Kathryn Abrams, I use the term "in a way that acknowledges an internal, as well as
an external or outwardly-oriented, aspect to agency, and that highlights the oppressed circumstances
of many who seek to exercise it." Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in
Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L REV. 304, 307 n.11 (1995). Agency thus denotes the "ability to
develop and act on conceptions of oneself that are not determined by dominant, oppressive
conceptions.' Id. The term agency will frequently be used with the term "resistance" because poor
people of color's agency under oppression "is necessarily partial or constrained," because of
"structures and practices that operate to deny or mitigate that capacity," and is "frequently directed
toward resisting those structures [and] practices." Id.
142. See idt at 346 (describing feminist critics who focus exclusively on women's capacity for
self-direction and resistance and their ability to overcome the powerlessness created by patriarchal
constraint as embracing "transcendent agency").
143. Grassroots successes have demonstrated that well organized grassroots groups are not
powerless in the sense of having no, or little, power-political or otherwise. Grassroots struggles can
be viewed as a crucial arena for restructuring power relations in a system of localized decision-
making, where environmental justice activists are dynamic agents in that reconstruction. This view of
power is Foucaultian in that it understands power as an ongoing process of social construction in
which both the dominant and subordinate are participating agents. As Steven Winter has written:
To understand power as a property of a social system of relations is to see power as a
shared resource that can be activated from many different positions within that system.
Once power is understood as relational, it becomes apparent that at least some of what the
dominant "have" must already be available to the subordinated. Indeed, there is an
important sense in which this second point is the same as the first. The deconstruction of
power is also the deconstruction of the agency and autonomy of the traditional liberal
subject. This means that responsibility for subordination and inequality cannot be localized
in certain identifiable agents; it is widely distributed throughout the social network. To the
exact degree that this understanding of power diminishes the agency of the dominant, it
amplifies the agency of the subordinated. What it subtracts from one part of the network, it
necessarily redistributes to the other.
Steven L. Winter, The "Power" Thing, 82 VA. L REv. 721, 835 (1996) (interpreting Michel
Foucault's conception of power as not a "thing" nor quality, capacity, or possession of particular
people; but rather as an emergent quality than can only take shape through the joint agency of all
those who participate in a given set of social relations).
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constraints, reflects individuals operating with "incomplete agency."'"
Viewed within the context of incomplete agency, the choices and actions
of individuals in grassroots struggles are "neither fully free nor com-
pletely determined."'4 Instead, they are influenced by independent
self-conceptions, or internal agency, and the reality of broader patterns
of oppression.'"
This richer, more complex view of power and agency in vulnerable,
yet resistant, communities forces us to scrutinize the forces, or mecha-
nisms, which render the agency of some actors incomplete. For instance,
such scrutiny will require an analysis of those forces that mediate be-
tween agents in a social relationship, so-called "third agents," which
allow the "powerful" to enact and reproduce their power. 47 This analy-
sis, in turn, necessitates an analysis of the legal and regulatory context in
which these struggles take place. The legal and/or regulatory context
either independently may constrain the agency of disaffected individu-
als or, alternatively, facilitate the constraints imposed by others in the
social structure.
A close study of grassroots struggles helps unmask the social and
structural constraints operating in a local system of environmental
decision-making and underlying the distributive outcomes.' 48 We can
see the many dimensions of power struggles, the relationships of actors
within that struggle, and the role of the siting process in structuring
those relationships. Focusing on the structural dynamics of a grassroots
struggle, particularly as they interact with the state/public apparatus, also
shifts the focus away from individual actors and the fruitless search for
clearly identified perpetrators and victims. The focus appropriately
shifts toward the structured nature of decision-making power. This more
144. Cf. Abrams, supra note 141, at 34748; see also Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and
Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1657, 1696 (1997).
145. Cf. Higgins, supra note 144, at 1691.
146. See Abrams, supra note 141, at 348 ("As contrasted with transcendent agency, internal
agency is hard-won and almost always partial or incomplete. So long as coercion and devaluation of
women continue in society, women must struggle with the tension between the 'outside' and 'inside'
visions of themselves, or among the multiple voices that make up their identities.").
147. As Iis Marion Young explains:
One agent can have institutionalized power over another only if the actions of many third
agents support and execute the will of the powerful. A judge may be said to have power
over a prisoner, but only in the context of a network of practices executed by prison
wardens, guards, record keepers, administrators, parole officers, lawyers, and so on. Many
people must do their jobs for the judge's power to be realized, and many of these people
will never directly interact with either the judge or the prisoner.
YOUNG, supra note 3, at 31.
148. As Luke Cole has written:
Engaging in what some critical race theorists and critical legal scholars have called"unmasking", grassroots activists have uncovered, through their own experiences, the
hidden power dynamics of pollution and environmental laws. They have acquired an
"institutional" understanding of the political economy of pollution.
Cole, supra note 7, at 642-43 (footnotes omitted).
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structural focus, in turn, can lead to fruitful discussions about the role of
siting process reforms in achieving environmental justice.
IV
THE STRUGGLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
IN CHESTER, PENNSYLVANIA
In the early 1990s, Chester's residents banded together to fight
back against what they viewed as an all-out attack on their community's
quality of life and health. At this point, Chester was home to the
Westinghouse incinerator, which is one of the country's largest waste
incinerators, the DELCORA sewage waste treatment facility, the
Abbonizio Recycling facility, and various older industrial operations. 49
The DEP was on the verge of permitting an infectious medical-waste
sterilization plant next to the Westinghouse incinerator. Concerned resi-
dents attended a public meeting in October of 1992, convened by the
City's first Democratic mayor. 15" Billed as a town meeting, it drew repre-
sentatives from the EPA and the DEP, local government officials, and
private industry. The residents aired their complaints about the facili-
ties-odors, dust, noise, and trucks carrying trash to the facilities. In-
dustry and government representatives offered responses such as, " Do
you think your government would do something wrong to you? Do you
think [we would allow this facility if it did not] meet all of the federal
and state regulations?"'' At least one resident found the attitude of the
representatives condescending. Zulene Mayfield stood up, introduced
herself, and told the representatives, "I can't understand why you
bright, college-educated people can't come down here and tell a better
lie than what you're telling. [W]e are people from probably the worst
school district in the state and we can see [and] understand these
lies .... "15 Zulene got up and left. From that point on, Zulene at-
tended the weekly meetings of concerned residents of Chester. Eventu-
ally, Chester Residents Concerned About Quality of Life (CRCQL)
formed, with Zulene at the helm.
A. Fighting Back and Running Up
against a Wall of Exclusion
The initial meetings with industry and government officials fore-
shadowed a pattern of stonewalling that emerged every time the
149. See supra Part I.
150. See infra Section IV.D.
151. Interview with Zulene Mayfield, chairperson of CRCQL, in Chester, Pennsylvania (Apr. 14,
1996) [hereinafter Mayfield Interview].
152. Id. Unless otherwise noted, all factual background and quotes in this Part are from the
Mayfield Interview, supra note 151.
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community sought information and solutions from industry and gov-
ernment. CRCQL first set out to have one-on-one meetings with indi-
vidual facility owners, city officials, and state officials. All these
meetings, however, ended in a similarly disappointing fashion. The resi-
dents came to the meetings to complain about existing problems, yet the
same problems surfaced week after week. Meetings ended with no
resolution in sight and residents' questions left unanswered. No one
seemed willing to take any responsibility for the problems the residents
of Chester faced. A facility representative would tell CRCQL members,
"Well, your problem is not exactly our problem," and then direct them
somewhere else. Zulene Mayfield recounts that she felt like she was "a
gerbil on a habitrail," running and never getting anywhere.
Eventually, the residents got fed up with the stonewalling. They
decided to sit all facility and government representatives together and"watch them point fingers at each other," instead of telling the resi-
dents to go talk to someone else. CRCQL arranged another meeting of
local and state agency officials, as well as representatives from the
Chester facilities. The confrontational dynamic expected at the meeting
never materialized. Government and industry representatives seemingly
agreed to divulge as little information as possible. For example, prior to
the meeting, there was a fire at the Westinghouse incinerator. Many
people from the community came out in force to photograph and tape
the commotion surrounding the numerous pieces of emergency equip-
ment employed to fight the fire. At the meeting, when the Westinghouse
representative was asked about the fire, he denied any fire had occurred.
The residents were dumbfounded; they had photographed and tape-
recorded a fire at the facility. Now, the company's representative was
denying its occurrence. During subsequent meetings, CRCQL continued
to challenge Westinghouse's denial. However, even when the fire chief
presented CRCQL and the Westinghouse representatives with documen-
tation of the fire, the company still denied there had been a fire. This
and other incidents made the residents feel belittled, as if Westinghouse
deliberately decided: "Well, we had a fire but let's tell them, 'We didn't
have a fire,' and that's it. We'll offer no explanation to them."'5 As
Zulene recalled, it was "very demeaning."
The government and industry officials' conduct at the meetings
exemplified the ways in which the decision-making process had ex-
cluded the residents all along-as if they did not matter. Moreover, it
seemed as though various tactics were employed to keep the residents in
the dark about issues fundamentally affecting their health and quality of
life. For instance, one of the barriers residents initially faced was an in-
ability to understand the highly technical language the facility
153. Id.
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representatives used. When a resident attempted to speak in an open
meeting to a Westinghouse representative about the incinerator, the rep-
resentative immediately corrected the resident, telling her that it was a
resource recovery facility." This tactic played on the lack of sophistica-
tion of the Chester residents and effectively silenced them. As one resi-
dent remarked, "Every meeting we left feeling like our tail was between
our legs, because they always tried to make us think that what was hap-
pening was not happening."'' 5 Believing that "intelligence" is an"equalizer," CRCQL members sought to familiarize themselves and
other Chester residents with the terminology and technology of the fa-
cilities."6 Nevertheless, even as the residents educated themselves, gov-
ernment and industry representatives continued to ignore them.
Meetings with facility representatives were completely unsatisfactory;
the residents felt unacknowledged and unheard.
B. Taking Direct Action
Refusing to surrender to government and industry stonewalling,
and seeing no other alternative, CRCQL took more direct action after
two important realizations. First, concerned residents tried to work
through the system-acquiring technical knowledge about the facilities,
reading all of the public documents, and requesting information from
decision-makers-but realized that their concerns would not be ad-
dressed, much less resolved, in that manner. Second, CRCQL felt that
decision-makers consistently demonstrated a lack of respect toward
residents trying to obtain further information about the facilities.
On a cold day in December 1992, the residents held their first pro-
test, focusing on one of the most visible and audible invasions into their
city-the trucks carrying waste to the Westinghouse incinerator. On the
morning of December 22, ten to fifteen residents, mostly senior citizens,
lined Thurlow Street in Chester to stop the trucks from reaching their
destination. Other residents joined in the protest on their lunch break.
Westinghouse finally responded after residents physically refused to let
the trucks take their load to the Westinghouse facility for up to two
hours. Westinghouse's chief financial officer flew to Chester during the
154. Arguably there is not much of a substantive difference between the two, other than
semantics. The storage and processing of solid waste is regulated under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901-87)
(West 1995) (RCRA). RCRA defines a "resource recovery facility" as one "at which solid waste is
processed for the purpose of extracting, converting to energy, or otherwise separating and preparing
solid waste for reuse." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(24) (West 1995). Incineration is one way of treating and/or
processing solid wastes. The Westinghouse facility is a trash-to-energy incinerator.
155. Laid to Waste, supra note 14.




protest to meet with the residents. After hearing their story,
Westinghouse officers agreed to build a new road for the trucks hauling
trash to the incinerator. Although the new route was built only one
block away, the residents felt this protest was a success . 5 For the first
time since they had begun to stand up and voice their opinions, they felt
empowered. As Zulene explained, "It was really important [for
Westinghouse] to understand that... this is important enough to stop
Christmas shopping, to stop the season .... to let [them] know that we
have a problem and we don't care how cold it is." The residents also
realized that they needed to hit Westinghouse where it hurt-in its bank
account. Thwarting normal business operations furthered this objective.
Despite the message of resistance sent by the protests, in July 1993,
the DEP issued a permit for the construction and operation of yet an-
other facility in Chester. The community learned that Midlantic
BioWaste Systems Inc., a subsidiary of Thermal Pure Systems (Thermal
Pure), planned to build an infectious medical waste sterilization plant
next to the Westinghouse incinerator. The proposed facility's operators
planned to sterilize medical-chemotherapeutic waste through a process
called autoclaving.'59 They would then package and ship the waste to a
landfill. For Chester residents, this was the last straw-the Thermal Pure
facility compounded an already intolerable situation. CRCQL mobilized
the Chester residents and gathered more than 500 signatures in opposi-
tion to the project. They gave these signatures to the DEP and the City
Council as evidence of their opposition to the facility. In response, the
company withdrew its permit application, originally filed under the cor-
porate name of Midlantic BioWaste Systems, and reapplied under the
name Thermal Pure. Again, this was nothing new. Zulene easily realized
they were "hiding behind names."
Unfortunately, the residents then uncovered an even more en-
trenched barrier-local politics. All of the city council members except
for the mayor sent a letter to the governor and to the DEP asking them
to expedite the permitting of Thermal Pure.16° Not surprisingly, the DEP
granted Thermal Pure's permit without holding a public hearing and
virtually ignoring the residents' concerns. To the residents' dismay, the
legal requirement designed. to include them in the decision-making
process ultimately denied the residents any opportunity to participate in
the process. In Pennsylvania, as in other states, permit applicants must
158. See MENDEL-REYES, supra note 17, at 153-58 (recounting the Chester protest).
159. Autoclaving sterilizes objects in an apparatus using superheated steam. Chester Residents
Concerned For Quality Living v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 668 A.2d 110, 111
n.1 (Pa. 1995).
160. See Mayfield Interview, supra note 151; Andy Murray, Waste Treatment Facilities in
Chester (visited Nov. 12, 1997) <http://www.envirolink.orglorgs/pen/crcql/facilities.htn-l> (CRCQL
Web Page).
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publish formal notice of their proposed facility in local newspapers to
give the public an opportunity to comment on and learn about the
facility."' However, this requirement often provides inadequate notice
to, in particular, low-income communities, where literacy levels are low,
and it is unlikely that many citizens will become aware of or read the
official notice. 62 For instance, as happened in Chester, it is not uncom-
mon for notice of a permit application to be placed in a minuscule
space at the back of the local newspaper. 63 Once again, the residents felt
the decision-makers had excluded them. The residents opined that
"[b]y not holding a public hearing, DEP was saying that there was no
known public opposition to Thermal Pure, in spite of the 500 plus sig-
natures they had in opposition."'"
C. A Hard Lesson: Environmental Justice
as a Political, Not a Legal, Issue
A Philadelphia public interest lawyer, Jerome Baiter, read an article
about the Chester protest and decided to call CRCQL. This call began a
long-term relationship between Balter and CRCQL. Through Baiter's
efforts, the residents discovered yet another weapon in their fight against
the facilities-legal action. In August 1993, one month after the
Thermal Pure permit was issued, Balter appealed the Thermal Pure
161. See 25 PA. CODE § 271.141 (West Supp. 1997) (listing public notice and comment as
general requirements for permits and permit applications). This section requires that the permit
applicant publish notice of its application once a week for three consecutive weeks in a "newspaper
of general circulation in the area where the proposed facility is located." Id. Permit applicants must
also give separate notice via certified mail to "owners and occupants of land contiguous to the site or
the proposed permit area." Id. This notice is intended to give the community a formal opportunity to
review applications and comment on them within a specific period of time.
162. See Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate
Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L
211, 240-41 (1994).
163. See Mayfield Interview, supra note 151. On the other hand, "local [officials] are given a
separate, formal opportunity to comment on municipal waste facility permit applications." Waste
Management Permits (visited Nov. 8, 1997) <http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/DEPUTATEenved/
_gowith_inspector/resourceVaste_.ManagePermit.htm.> (Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Protection Home
Page). Once the applicant submits its application to the DEP, it must send a copy to the city. See 25
PA. CODE § 271.141(d) (West Supp. 1997). City officials are then free to raise objections, or give
their support, directly to the DEP. If, as in this case, local officials are in favor of a facility for
economic reasons, the community's health and quality of life concerns are not likely to be raised or
addressed in the decision-making process.
164. Russell, Perpetrators, supra note 26. The relevant section is more permissive than
mandatory. See 25 PA. CODE § 271.143 (a) (West Supp. 1997) ("The Department may conduct
public hearings for the purpose of receiving information on an application for a new
permit... wherever there is significant public interest or the Department deems a hearing
appropriate.").
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permit on CRCQL's behalf. 5 In its appeal, CRCQL claimed that the
permit issued to Thermal Pure and the accompanying regulations
promulgated by the DEP violated the Pennsylvania Infectious and
Chemotherapeutic Waste Disposal Act (Disposal Act), which the legisla-
ture enacted to control waste flow in Pennsylvania.'"
Pursuant to the Disposal Act, the DEP promulgated the Infectious
and Chemotherapeutic Waste Plan (Waste Plan). The effect of the Waste
Plan was to divide Pennsylvania into three zones-eastern, central, and
western-in order to regulate "incineration or other disposal" of infec-
tious wastes. 67 The DEP found that the eastern zone, which includes
Chester and Philadelphia, generated 13,335 tons of infectious waste per
year.16 Under the Waste Plan, covered facilities must obtain 70% of their
waste from the zone in which the facility is located. The maximum ca-
pacity of a covered facility located within the eastern zone could be no
greater than 10,765 tons per year.' 69 Thermal Pure's permit nevertheless
allowed the facility to handle 105,000 tons per year, nearly ten times the
maximum the Waste Plan allowed for a given facility in the eastern re-
gion, and nearly four times the waste produced by the entire state of
Pennsylvania. 70 In its appeal, CRCQL questioned how a facility with the
capacity to treat four times the waste produced in the entire state could
be legal under a statute that was intended to minimize waste transporta-
tion in Pennsylvania.'
165. The appeal was filed with the Environmental Hearing Board, which consists of a
chairperson and four members, all administrative law judges appointed by the governor. The Board
hears appeals from actions of the Pennsylvania DEP. See 25 PA. CODE § 1021.2(a) (West 1995).
166. The Commonwealth enacted the Disposal Act to "manag[e] [infectious and
chemotherapeutic wastes] at their place of generation with a minimum of transportation .... and (to
ensure] that such wastes are best managed, processed and disposed of and rendered harmless by
means of current state-of-the-art high-temperature incineration." 1988 Pa. Laws 525 (codified as
amended at 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. §§ 6019.1-6019.6 (West 1993)). However, pursuant to the Disposal
Act, the Pennsylvania legislature also directed the DEP to address the siting and distribution of
facilities for the "incineration or other disposal" of infectious or chemotherapeutic wastes. Id.
167. "Infectious wastes are those contaminated by disease producing micro-organisms which
may harm or threaten human health." Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Dep't of
Envtl. Resources, 655 A.2d 609,610 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), rev'd 668 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1995).
168. Id. at 610. Of that 13,335 tons generated, approximately 5,800 tons per year are
"incinerated or otherwise disposed [of]" at the sites where the waste is generated. Id. Thus, 7,735
tons per year must be transported from the places of generation to a covered facility for disposal. Id.
169. See id. This figure assumes that "all of the infectuous waste generated in the eastern zone
were shipped to this single facility for incineration." Id.
170. The DEP found that the total quantity of infectious and chemotherapeutic wastes generated
throughout all of Pennsylvania is 26,500 tons per year. See id. at 609.
171. Simply stated, the legal issue on appeal was whether Thermal Pure's autoclaving facility
constituted a "disposal" facility subject to the Disposal Act and Waste Plan. CRCQL believed that the
DEP had violated the Act by not holding Thermal Pure to the standards set out in the Disposal Act,
and therefore, that the permit issued was invalid. Since the Waste Plan promulgated, by the DEP
excluded from consideration all facilities other than commercial incinerators, Thermal Pure argued
neither the Waste Plan nor the Disposal Act reached it. See Chester Residents, 655 A.2d at 611.
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In February 1994, the Environmental Hearing Board summarily
dismissed CRCQL's claims. The Board ruled that the DEP Waste Plan
did not govern the Thermal Pure infectious waste sterilization process
and that its permit was valid. CRCQL refused to give up. It appealed the
decision to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. In February 1995,
the commonwealth court adopted CRCQL's reasoning, overturned the
Environmental Hearing Board ruling, and declared that the Thermal
Pure permit was invalid.'72 Thermal Pure then appealed to both the
commonwealth court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for a stay of
the ruling against them. Both requests were denied. Accordingly, the
DEP issued a cease and desist order to Thermal Pure, forcing the com-
pany to suspend all further operations in Chester.
To CRCQL's amazement, their victory and the closure of Thermal
Pure was short-lived. Under Pennsylvania law, Thermal Pure had the
right to appeal the DEP closure order to the Environmental Hearing
Board.7' Instead, the company directly appealed the DEP order to the
commonwealth court. Thermal Pure filed a petition asking the com-
monwealth court to review its previous decision not to stay the cease and
desist order. At the same time, Thermal Pure requested the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to exercise special jurisdiction and hear argument on the
stay. To everyone's surprise, the supreme court granted Thermal Pure's
request, issuing a stay of the cease and desist order pending its review of
the case.
In taking the case from the commonwealth court, the supreme
court employed a controversial, and extraordinary, legal maneuver. The
supreme court invoked its "King's Bench" power to take the case from
the commonwealth court. The King's Bench power originates from the
Act that created the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania in 1722, which gave the court power coterminous with the
highest courts in England. An 1836 revision of the Act establishing the
King's Bench power gave the court jurisdiction to stop all existing pro-
ceedings in a lower court, while it conducts its own review of a case. 74 A
later constitutional provision, entitled "extraordinary jurisdiction,"
seemed to limit the supreme court's King's Bench jurisdiction to cases
172. The Court rejected the DEP's and Thermal Pure's argument that the Disposal Act did not
cover the type of activity-autoclaving, a type of medical sterilization-conducted by the Thermal
Pure facility. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the plain language of the Disposal Act indicates
that the legislature intended the Act to apply not solely to "incineration or other disposal" of infectious
and chemotherapeutic wastes, but also to the collection, transportation, processing, and storage of
those wastes. Hence, it found that the DEP Waste Plan violated the Disposal Act, because it failed to
address the siting and regulation of sterilization facilities such as Thermal Pure. See id. at 612.
173. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 755.5 (West 1993) (establishing jurisdiction of the
Environmental Hearing Board).
174. See Commonwealth v. Onda, 103 A.2d 90, 91 (Pa. 1954) (citing Act of May 22, 1722, 1 Smr.
L. 131, 17 P.S. § 41, and Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784 § 1; 17 P.S. § 41).
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of "immediate public importance"-consistent with the power's early
beginnings. 75 In spite of its normal conservative practice, there have
been "a number of remarkable occasions" on which the supreme court
has invoked its jurisdiction in a manner that has expanded the King's
Bench power "beyond its original parameters. 76 This arguable over-
reaching has prompted the state legislature to revisit the question of the
King's Bench power.'" Nevertheless, the supreme court took the case
before the commonwealth court was able to hear Thermal Pure's ap-
peal. The effect of this exercise of the King's Bench power was to deny
CRCQL any chance at an appeal.
Prior to making its final decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held a hearing on the DEP regulations and the Thermal Pure permit.
CRCQL was invited to attend the hearing and chartered a bus to
Harrisburg. The group arrived with high hopes because, as Zulene May-
field said, they believed that "the law is the law and whatever the law
says is right. Everybody has to adhere to the law." Sadly, for Zulene
Mayfield and CRCQL, they were about to confront yet another tangible
experience of institutional racism. Zulene recalls the look of
"contempt" in the eyes of the justices as the group entered the court-
room. "I can't say it was a look of hate," she explains, but she "knew
before we sat down in that court what the outcome was going to be."
Jerome Balter represented CRCQL at the hearing and has his own
view of the proceedings. Noting that there was no transcript or record-
ing of the hearing, Baiter relates the atmosphere that prevailed in the
room. A justice said to Baiter, "Mr. Baiter, if it were up to you a lot of
companies would lose their permits." To which Balter replied, "I don't
take any permits away. That's the DEP's job." The justice did not re-
lent, "Yes, but you start those cases, don't you?" Baiter responded,
"Well, that's right. I would think, your Honor, that you'd be interested
175. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 726 (West 1981):
[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the Supreme Court may, on its own motion or
upon petition of any party, in any matter pending before any court or district justice of this
Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public importance, assume plenary
jurisdiction of such matter at any stage thereof and enter a final order or otherwise cause
right and justice to be done.
Id. See also In re Petition of Blake, 593 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1991) (construing section 726 as an
elaboration of the King's Bench powers); Commonwealth v. Lang, 537 A.2d 1361, 1363 n.1 (Pa.
1988) (same).
176. Bernard F. Scherer, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Origins of King's Bench
Power, 32 DuQ. L. REv. 525, 525-26 (1994).
177. See, e.g., Frank Reeves, Special Power of State Court Challenged, PnrrsBURoH
POSr-GAZETTE, July 23, 1995, at Al (reporting on the House Judiciary Committee's plans to hold
hearings on King's Bench power and the Thermal Pure decision and noting that state representatives
have questioned the power in the past).
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in having the law defended and applied properly." The justice had the
final word, "Mr. Baiter, around here I am the law. 178
In November 1995, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned
the commonwealth court ruling by a vote of 5-0, allowing Thermal Pure
to reopen.179 In its decision, the supreme court ruled that the
commonwealth court lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and that the
Waste Disposal Act merely addressed incineration and other disposal,
and did not cover sterilization-Thermal Pure's process. 80 Accordingly,
the permit was deemed valid.
The decision exists under a cloud of illegitimacy for many Chester
residents. According to CRCQL, the supreme court's initial use of the
King's Bench power, and its ultimate disposition of the case, may have
been influenced by the firm responsible for the recent proliferation of
waste sites in Chester. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Zappala is the brother of a partner in Russell, Rea, and Zappala, owners
of most of the facilities located in Chester.81 Justice Zappala recused
himself from the Chester case, but CRCQL believes he "exercised his
influence" by "convincing the court to use the outdated King's Bench
statute.' 8 2 While this accusation has yet to be proven,'83 the appearance
of impropriety sounded the death knell for CRCQL's belief that the law
would provide justice for people like themselves. In their eyes, this was
yet another example of the structural power of racism. As Zulene sum-
marized, "racism is real," and it is "the determining -factor [in] whether
or not you're going to get justice." Jerome Baiter, in contrast, believes
the community relied too heavily on the legal system. "There is a reli-
ance on legal action, and no matter how much the lawyer says 'don't
count on it,' they count on it. " "
CRCQL learned a powerful lesson: While legal action brings much-
needed attention to environmental justice struggles, legal strategies
rarely address what is, in essence, a larger political and structural
178. Interview with Jerome Baiter, attorney for CRCQL, in Phila., Pa. (Dec. 3, 1996).
179. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Dep't Envtl. Resources, 668 A.2d
110 (Pa. 1995).
180. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the mass reduction that follows incineration as
the determining factor in their interpretation of the Act. As sterilization did not reduce mass, it was
not covered by the Act. See id.
181. See supra Part I.B; see also Brian O'Neill, Zappala Slips His Family Ties, PrrTsBURGH
POST-GAZETrE, Aug. 24, 1994, at CI (noting Justice Zappala's admission that he bought securities in
Russell, Rea & Zappala).
182. Russell, Perpetrators, supra note 26.
183. This accusation has been repeated in the press, however. See, e.g., Frank Reeves, Special
Power of State Court Challenged, PrrrsauaRH POSt-GAZETTE, July 23, 1995, at Al ("It is another
example of the exercise of the 'King's Bench' authority by the court for no apparent reason and
where a member of the court, although he has recused himself, has an apparent familial interest in
the case.") (quoting Rep. Piccola of Dauphin County).
184. Baiter, supra note 178.
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problem . 85 As the struggle surrounding the Thermal Pure case illus-
trates, lawsuits take place in a forum in which the resources of private
corporations and government entities far outweigh community re-
sources.'86 Given their experience with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
the
Chester community is unlikely to rely solely on legal strategies in the
future. In fact, the group realizes that legal strategies, even hopeful ones
like the Title VI action they are currently pursuing, are merely "another
stone in David's sling," a way to bolster their political struggle for em-
powerment and inclusion.'
D. Avoiding the Slippery Slope: Becoming Political Actors
In late 1994, CRCQL became aware of yet another potential hazard
targeted for their community. Soil Remediation Systems (SRS) recently
had filed a permit application with the DEP to construct a soil incinera-
tion facility in Chester. Once again, the community mobilized. Petitions,
protests, and a well-attended public hearing sent the message to SRS and
the DEP that the community did not want another facility.
Yet again, residents faced questionable tactics employed by the fa-
cility proponents. For example, early in the public hearing, a young
man from the community stood up and said, "I don't care what they
do, I need a job."'88 After the resident spoke, one of Zulene's friends-
a man she considered a nephew-approached her and explained what
was happening. Pointing to the man who had just spoken, he hugged
her and said, "I'll tell you what's up, he's paid. And they paid me too,
but I'm not going to talk." This tactic, of course, was not new. In a
sense, it was the classic jobs-for-environment tradeoff that faces oppo-
nents of hazardous waste facilities.'89 The facilities were following the
time-honored practice of businesses hoping to move into financially
ailing communities, and offering financial incentives and increased
185. Many environmental justice advocates view struggles to stop the proliferation of hazardous
waste sites as inherently political, not legal, problems. As Luke Cole pointed out, "because someone
in the government has decided to allow a company to dump in their neighborhood," what is required
to change that decision is a "political tool." Cole, supra note 7, at 648. As such, litigation and most
legal strategies are viewed as vehicles for broader political organizing and community
empowerment. See Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View From the Field, 90
MICH. L. REv. 1991, 1995-97 (1992); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470, 513 (1976)
("Litigation can and should serve lawyer and client as a community-organizing tool, an educational
forum, a means of obtaining data, a method of exercising political leverage, and a rallying point for
public support.").
186. See Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism, supra note 185, at 1996.
187. See generally Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's
Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. W. 523 (1994).
188. Mayfield Interview, supra note 151.
189. See Bullard, supra note 106, at 85-86, 90-91.
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employment opportunities. CRCQL was well aware that the community
needed more jobs and economic development. Yet the group was un-
willing to sacrifice the quality of their homes, neighborhood, and health
for the illusory gains the facility promised. Most of the residents had
seen enough waste facilities move into Chester to realize the hollowness
of such incentives and job offers.
Fortunately, CRCQL had gained powerful allies by this time. In
1992, after decades of Republican party reign that kept "tight control
over the city's votes by controlling public funds in such a way that
every government function was delivered as a personal favor," the
Democratic party overthrew the Republicans in what CRCQL calls "one
of the most impressive political campaigns in the city's history."'
CRCQL benefited from this change of leadership: the group convinced
all five members of the city council to oppose the SRS permit.
Moreover, CRCQL, in a meeting with the Secretary of the DEP, con-
vinced the agency to delay the decision until the EPA completed its
health study of Chester. 9 ' Despite the public outcry, the opposition by
the city council, and the EPA's troubling conclusions in its health as-
sessment of Chester, the DEP granted the SRS permit.
As the political tide turned in CRCQL's favor, group members
shifted the focus of their political actions. Instead of "reacting to the
actions of the industries and the government" and "trying to convince
the power brokers to act on their behalf," the residents moved proac-
tively to "cut these industries off at the pass."'" CRCQL again rallied
the residents to the cause. CRCQL's first successful step in this direction
was to convince the city council to amend the zoning code so that waste
management industries would face more difficulty when attempting to
site facilities in Chester. The group then canvassed the city for signa-
tures for a petition to amend the zoning ordinance. They collected
3,000 signatures and presented them to the city council. The council
commenced to drag its feet until CRCQL confronted it and said, "If
every meeting we have to call all 3,000 people and tell them the ordi-
nance is not signed, we will do that."'93
In June 1994, the city council passed an ordinance requiring any
waste company hoping to locate in Chester to prove that the operation
of its proposed facility would not increase overall pollution levels in the
city. SRS failed to meet the burden of proof under the ordinance. As a
190. Kelley, supra note 28; see also Hinds, supra note 27 (noting that "Republicans, who
outnumber Democrats 2 to 1 in this predominantly black city, have controlled the government since
1866," and characterizing the recent Democratic victory as a "stunning upset," largely attributable to"a grass roots voter-registration drive").
191. See supra Section IA.
192. Russell, Perpetrators, supra note 26.
193. Mayfield Interview, supra note 151.
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result, SRS lost its DEP permit because it could not get a building li-
cense from the city and, thus, failed to break ground by the permit's
specified deadline. As one CRCQL member remarked, "Finally, the
government was forced to react to the residents, instead of the other way
around." 94
E. The Importance of Building Coalitions
Even before CRCQL's brief victory and stinging legal defeat in the
Thermal Pure case, its leaders realized that to be effective, CRCQL
needed to have broader appeal. By 1993, the group had become pri-
marily African-American and was represented as such in local media.
However, it had not always been that way.
When formed in 1992, CRCQL had two co-chairs: Reverend Strand,
from the African-American community, and Monsignor Probaski, head
of the local Ukrainian and Polish Catholic congregation. Monsignor
Probaski was one of the primary organizers of the Westinghouse dem-
onstration. However, during the demonstration, Probaski's secretary
came to Thurlow Street and told him that the Archdiocese in
Philadelphia wanted to speak to him right away. Shortly thereafter,
Probaski returned to the protesters and insisted they disband. The pro-
testers initially refused but eventually agreed to march down to the fa-
cility and then disband. At CRCQL's meeting after the protest, Probaski
disclosed that he had received a $500 check from Westinghouse to
renovate his church. He then told the group that he had ripped up the
check and sent it back to Westinghouse. Curiously, the week following
the meeting, Probaski resigned as co-chair of CRCQL and withdrew
from the group. When he left, so did many of his Ukrainian and Polish
parishioners. With the loss of Monsignor Probaski, CRCQL became
primarily an African-American organization. Currently, the group is
approximately 70% African American, with the rest of the group con-
sisting of elderly Polish women, Latinos, and whites. 9
In addition to its changing identity, other events forced CRCQL to
reevaluate itself. For instance, during the legal battle against Thermal
Pure, CRCQL experienced numerous forms of intimidation. The
CRCQL office has been vandalized twice. In one of the incidents, fea-
tured prominently in the video Laid to Waste, CRCQL's office was van-
dalized and "KKK" was scrawled prominently above Zulene's desk. As
the group's leader, Zulene received the brunt of many threats against
CRCQL. Zulene recalls a neighbor "telling all the little old ladies I bet-
ter be careful or else somebody is going to firebomb my house." Ad-
ditionally, her home and car have been vandalized repeatedly, and
194. Russell, Perpetrators, supra note 26.
195. Mayfield Interview, supra note 151.
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occasionally, she receives expletive-laden threats, including death
threats, on her answering machine. To top it off, Westinghouse threat-
ened to bring a $250,000 lawsuit against Zulene personally for blocking
its trucks during CRCQL's protest. 196
The loss of many of its non-African-American members, the legal
loss to Thermal Pure, and the intimidation tactics used against CRCQL
members slowly took their toll. Many group members asked themselves,
"How effective are we going to be if this machinery still views us in a
[negative] way?"'97 CRCQL sought to find a way to rejuvenate itself
from the pain of racism that was destroying its effectiveness as a citizens
group. To expand is coalition, CRCQL sent out invitations over the
Internet to an environmental justice retreat they held at Swarthmore
College in February 1995. The conference not only informed and edu-
cated students about the concept of environmental justice, it created the
Campus Coalition Concerning Chester (C4). Today, this student group
consists of students from over fifteen campuses from four states, in-
cluding nearby Swarthmore College. The purpose of C4 is to assist
CRCQL in its battle to educate and fight against environmental injustice
in the Chester community. According to Zulene, CRCQL wanted to get
people the decision-makers could "relate to;" if not parents then "let's
get the children," the group reasoned. The goal was to "educate the
kids and let the kids go home" and ask their parents the kinds of ques-
tions confronting the Chester community.
By broadening CRCQL's base, Zulene and other members felt they
could both build a more politically sustainable partnership, as well as
"take the focus off" CRCQL as an African-American organization.
Thus far, according to Zulene, the partnership with C4 has been"wonderful"-educating people on campus, in Chester, and in sur-
rounding communities, C4 has also been involved in protests with
CRCQL. Soon after C4 was formed, they joined a protest against RR&Z
at the firm's Pittsburgh offices. In the summer of 1995, CRCQL and C4
conducted a door-to-door health survey of Chester, which helped to
document the poor public health of the community and to bolster the
residents' claims of environmental damage. Their partnership has also
spawned the Chester-Swarthmore College Community Coalition. Estab-
lished by grant money, the coalition encourages college students and
196. The threat of lawsuits against active community members or groups, widely known as
"SLAPPS"-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation-has been reported as a growing
phenomenon. See GEORGE Wv. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GETTING SUED FOR
SPEAKING OuT (1996). This may or may not have been the motivation behind the Westinghouse
threat. Nevertheless, the effect of the threat was to motivate the group into broadening its base.
197. Mayfield Interview, supra note 151.
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faculty to work in the Chester community to establish a broad range of
social service programs. 9 '
F. Chester Today
Today, the ebb and flow of toxic assault and political protest in
Chester continues. Some siting battles are currently simmering, and
others have been resolved. In December 1995, the Cherokee
Environmental Group applied for a permit to burn contaminated soil in
Chester. Residents once again mobilized to fight the facility and over
200 concerned residents, suburban neighbors, and other interested citi-
zens attended the public hearing held in February 1997. CRCQL's ef-
forts may have paid off. In November 1997, the DEP informed CRCQL
that the Cherokee permit had been denied on various technical
grounds."9 The denial of the Cherokee permit, perhaps not coinciden-
tally, has taken place at a time when CRCQL has achieved other signifi-
cant victories.
Recently, CRCQL successfully settled an environmental lawsuit,
brought under the Clean Air Act, against the county's twenty-year-old
DELCORA sewage treatment facility, which receives and treats waste for
all of Delaware County. In December 1997, the year-and-a-half-long
negotiation between CRCQL, EPA, DEP, and DELCORA, finally came
to an end. As part of a consent decree, DELCORA has agreed to a
$320,000 penalty, divided into two parts: $120,000 to go to the EPA and
DEP, and $200,000 to be used to fund a children's lead-poisoning pre-
vention program that Chester residents will manage.r ° Settlement discus-
sions with Westinghouse over Clean Air Act violations ended in similar
198. See Monica Yant, From One Man's Strength, a Choir Camp That Chops: Disciplining
Voices and Character, PHILA. INQuIRER, July 3, 1997, at Al (describing a summer camp for the
Chester Boys Choir offering tai chi, karate, math and reading, and baseball and swimming classes).
199. In its denial letter, the DEP listed various reasons for denying the waste permit. Among the
reasons were the following: (I) the application did not provide complete and accurate information,
pursuant to 25 PA. CODE §§ 287.124-287.125, regarding the identification of interests and compliance
information pertaining to the applicant and related parties; (2) the application did not provide
sufficient detail or design information to allow the DEP to approve the method proposed for
protecting the facility from a flood and soil erosion, in violation of 25 PA. CODE §§ 202, 232, 297.106;
(3) the application did not provide sufficient information to allow the DEP to determine adequately
the potential for, or the need to mitigate, harm to the surrounding community from noise impacts
related to the operation of the facility, in violation of 25 PA. CODE § 287.127; and (4) there was not
sufficient information on pre-treatment, treatment, and post-treatment parameters for each category
of waste proposed to be accepted at the facility, in violation of 25 PA. CODE §§ 134, 287.132,
297.101. The DEP also denied Cherokee's application for an air permit. See Cherokee Biotechnology
Plant Defeated! (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http://www.envirolink.org/orgs/en/crcqlV
cherokee.goesL.down.html> (CRCQL Web Site) (summarizing the letter).
200. See Victoria Rivkin, Chester Residents Achieve "Environmental Victory:" Unique
Settlement for $320,000 Calls for Environmental Justice, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 24, 1997, at 5;
see also Ramona Smith, 320G Fine Helps Fight Lead Paint, PHILA. DAILY NEws, Dec. 19, 1997, at
28. DELCORA has denied any wrongdoing in the consent decree. Id.
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fashion.201 And in January 1998, CRCQL received more good news. A
federal court ruled that residents have a "private right of action," under
discriminatory-effect regulations, promulgated by the EPA pursuant to
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, to challenge the proliferation of waste
treatment facilities on grounds of racial discrimination.'u This ruling
clears the way for the Chester environmental justice suit, discussed
above,' °a against the Pennsylvania DEP for granting permits to five
waste-processing facilities in Chester.20
Nevertheless, the political tide may be turning against CRCQL. In
1996, Republicans regained control of Chester after a mixed reaction to
the city's short-lived Democratic administration. 5 Residents are par-
ticularly concerned that the newly elected city council may overturn the
recently enacted zoning ordinance.
CRCQL also faces a complex, continuing fight over the importation
of waste from three states to feed Chester's massive Westinghouse incin-
erator. CRCQL scored a major, but short-lived, victory through the
demonstration they staged in November 1996 at the State of Delaware's
Solid Waste Authority's (SWA) offices.'ee The SWA recently met to
201. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
202. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3rd Cir. 1998).
203. See supra Section I.C.
204. Another recent proposal was the siting of a pet crematory in Chester. When residents
learned of the proposal, they began to educate the community and successfully rallied significant
opposition to the facility. In January 1997, the veterinarian withdrew the permit at a zoning committee
hearing. See Accomplishments of C-4 and the Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living
(visited Nov. 9, 1997) <http:llwww.envirolink.orglorgslpenlcrcqllaccomp.htm> (CRCQL Web page).
205. The turnover may be attributable in part to both low voter turnout, not suprising in low-
income communities of color, and to the tumultous reign of the Democratic administration. See, e.g.,
Dan Hardy, Chester Mayor Says Council Is Usurping Power, PmLA. INQUIRER, July 8, 1992, at B1
(reporting that the Democractic mayor, Barbara Bohannan-Sheppard, sued four city council
colleagues and the city solicitor, contending they usurped her powers to manage her own
administration); Dan Hardy, Council Coalition Keeps Chester Mayor on Outside, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Apr. 30, 1992, at B4 (reporting that the city council intensified its assault on the Democratic mayor,
stripping her of much of her staff and filling council vacancies with Republicans; this move was the
latest in the escalating conflict between the mayor and the city council-a struggle that virtually
paralyzed city government). How much the tide is turning against CRCQL is unclear. Despite the fact
that the Republican mayor of Chester announced his full support of the Cherokee permit application,
that permit was denied.
206. Demonstrators described the protest as "unorthodox." According to its participants, the
number of protesters never exceeded twenty individuals, and the demonstration was staged in an
industrial park far from regular traffic. CRCQL and C4 members marched on the street in front of the
Authority's offices, demanded a meeting with SWA to discuss waste shipments to Chester, and
probably were noticed only by the Waste Authority personnel. Barely an hour passed before SWA
officials met with the protesters. They agreed to meet later in the month to discuss Chester's
residents' concerns. At this meeting, CRCQL presented SWA with a record of Westinghouse's
emission violations. SWA expressed genuine surprise at the long list of transgressions, which included
the emission of some pollutants at levels exceeding what is deemed safe for the surrounding
community. See Andy Murray, Chester Residents and Supporters Protest in Delaware (visited Nov. 9,
1997) <http.//www.envirolink.org/orgs/seac 13/c4/dswa.htmi> (C4 Web Page) (on file with author).
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reconsider its export of 225,000 tons of trash per year to the
Westinghouse incinerator. In January 1997, the SWA, whose shipments
accounted for 25% of the incinerator's waste stream, voted to discon-
tinue its shipments to the Westinghouse incinerator. Those responsible
for feeding the Westinghouse incinerator did not remain idle, however.
After the incinerator was sold to new owners, the SWA reversed its deci-
sion and signed a new contract in May 1997 with the incinerator's new
owners, American Ref-Fuel. Under this agreement, 300,000 tons of
waste per year may be burned at the Chester incinerator. 7
Despite the recent and potential setbacks, CRCQL has created a
venerable legacy-it is now a political force to be reckoned with in
Chester. What began as a small group of residents concerned with their
quality of life and their health, has grown into an organization with the
power to engage decision-makers on issues that fundamentally affect
the residents' material livelihood. Indeed, CRCQL's biggest victory may
be that it is a cohesive, healthy group and is still fighting in coalition
with C4. A self-taught community organizer, Zulene Mayfield recog-
nizes that the importance of CRCQL's struggle goes beyond the indi-
vidual victories and defeats in their campaign against the toxic facilities
in Chester. "Historically, black people haven't realized the power they
have. The people who have realized it, who have the knowledge, have to
teach the others. We have to start using our own power.""8
V
PURSUING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
SITING PROCESS REFORMS, STRONG PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY,
AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS
The Chester experience suggests that distributive paradigms of jus-
tice are merely a starting point in understanding the phenomenon of
environmental injustice. CRCQL began its struggle out of concern about
the accumulation of hazardous waste facilities in their community and
the effects those facilities had on the community's quality of life-the
trucks, dust, noise, and odor. As their efforts to find out more about the
facilities in their community progressed, their struggle became more
multi-faceted. In the end, their resistance was as much about the legiti-
macy of decision-making processes which fundamentally affect their
lives as it was about the outcomes of those processes.
Because environmental decision-making processes are neutral to-
ward existing social inequalities, I have argued that they reproduce these
207. See Murray, supra note 206; Urgent Actionl-Delaware Solid Waste Authority Votes to
Continue Burning Delaware Garbage in Chester, PA, RELEASE (Green, Del., Bear, Del.), May 1,
1997, at 1-2.
208. MENDEL-REYEs, supra note 17, at 158 (citation omitted).
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inequalities in the environmental context. As Chester illustrates, the very
social and structural constraints that operate in the larger world continue
to constrain individuals in the environmental decision-making process.
Because of their economic, social, and political isolation, Chester resi-
dents, like other low-income people of color, feel that they are viewed
and treated as marginal to decision-making processes. In addition, a
disparity in available resources persists in communities such as Chester
because they "enter the fray with less information and specialized
knowledge concerning the legal, technical, and economic issues in-
volved."" Moreover, though many federal and state environmental
laws promise participatory decision-making, Chester illustrates the fail-
ure of such laws to include disaffected communities in environmental
decisions.
Can reforms in the environmental decision-making process address
the problems faced by Chester residents? President Clinton's Executive
Order" ' and various state laws1 indicate that policy-makers are seri-
ously beginning to consider such reforms. In this Part, I will discuss
some of these reforms and their potential to achieve "environmental
justice" in places such as Chester.212 Even in spite of the most effective
siting process reforms, direct grassroots participation and organization
strategies continue to be necessary. The real success of the grassroots
movement for environmental justice will be in creating an ongoing role
for community participation in a variety of decisions that affect resi-
dents' lives.
A. Grassroots Experiences and Siting Process Reforms:
Taking Social Structure Seriously
Many types of siting process reforms have been proposed and en-
acted at the state and local levels. Perhaps the most common aspect of
these reforms is their effort to control or influence the distribution of
hazardous waste facilities. Distributive models of environmental justice
209. Eileen Guana, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENvTL L.J. 3, 14 (1998).
210. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994) (requiring each federal agency to
"make achieving environmental justice part of its mission;" to comply, agencies must issue detailed
reports outlining their plan to eliminate racially disparate environmental effects).
211. States that have passed environmental justice legislation include Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, and North Carolina. See ALA. CODE § 22-30-5.1 (1990); A R.
CODE ANN. §§ 8-6-1501 (Michie 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.85 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §
12-8-25.4 (Harrison 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.2011(D)(5) (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN.
Art. 41, § 18-315 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-325(a) (1994).
212. It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this Article to account for and analyze fully
the realm of proposed and potential siting process reforms. There is a great deal of activity on both
the state, local, and, to a lesser extent, federal levels regarding siting process reforms. Most of this
Article's discussion pertains to reforms that have been recently proposed or have become law.
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are extremely attractive because they seem to get right at the heart of the
empirical evidence. They aim to stop the disproportionate impact of
LULUs in any given community, particularly if that community already
hosts a similar facility.23 However, if environmental racism or injustice is
partly a manifestation of larger structural inequities, then distributive
remedies alone may not be enough. As commentators such as Vicki
Been have correctly pointed out, because of post-siting economic and
social processes, merely redistributing or fairly distributing LULUs may
only re-create a pattern of disproportionate siting.2"4 The one caveat to
this broad dismissal of purely distributive solutions is that if siting proc-
ess reforms were to impose a physically proportional distribution
among communities, the pattern of maldistribution would not be re-
created because every community would, or could, eventually host a
hazardous waste facility or other LULU. As such, "the incentive to
move away from a LULU would be reduced because no community
would be immune from LULU siting." 25
However, even a perfectly proportional distributive scheme would
not address many of the problems confronting communities such as
Chester in the environmental decision-making process. As in framing
environmental injustice, distribution is merely a starting point when
conceptualizing what environmental justice would entail. Without more,
a purely distributional scheme does nothing to address the process for
siting even a single facility in a scheme which simply limits the number
of facilities in a given area. First, it is not clear what role the affected
community would play in picking the first, or only, facility in such a
scheme. What role would community choice and its assessment of the
burdens and benefits of a given facility play in determining whether to
locate that facility in a given area? Second, and somewhat related, is the
213. See, e.g., AR. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1501 (Michie 1993) (creating a rebuttable presumption
against permitting a "high impact solid waste management facility" within twelve miles of any
existing "high impact solid waste management facility"); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-25.4 (Harrison
1996) (prohibiting the permitting of any solid waste handling facility within an area which already
includes all or a portion of three or more landfills in a two-mile radius).
214. As Been explains:
For example, assume that on a given date, all LULUs then needed were dispersed 'fairly'
throughout society. Wealthier individuals would respond to the distribution by moving away
from LULUs. Consequently, sites located in wealthier areas would eventually be
surrounded by a ring of land deserted by wealthier families. The LULU would cause
property values in that ring to be lower than in surrounding areas. The ring would then
become a ghetto of lower income households. In short, the pattern of disproportionate siting
would be re-created.
Been, supra note 69, at 1018 (also noting various arguments and empirical evidence which cast
considerable doubt on the likelihood of this particular scenario occuring).
215. Id. at 1020. Some environmental justice legislation seems to embrace this approach. For
instance, Alabama prohibits the siting of more than one "commercial waste facility or disposal site" in
any given county. ALA. CODE § 22-30-5.1 (1990). Of course, this type of legislation does not prevent
other types of facilities or LULUs from being sited in a county.
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question of what criteria would, or could, be used in choosing even one
facility. Without some guidance, low-income communities of color
could very well end up with more burdensome facilities than more
privileged communities, even when the number of facilities is limited."6
For instance, while waste facilities were located elsewhere in Delaware
County, the facilities with the capacity to process greater amounts of
waste were located in Chester.2 7 Hence, it is necessary to pay attention to
the process of siting facilities even in a scheme which heavily controls
the ultimate distribution of those facilities.
Two trends in environmental justice policy-making may potentially
address the issue of fairness in a siting process in which distributive out-
comes are heavily regulated. The first trend attempts to factor commu-
nity choice explicitly into the siting process, even where a proportional
distribution of facilities is sought. For instance, an Arkansas statute cre-
ates a "rebuttable presumption" against permitting the construction or
operation of a "high impact solid waste facility" within twelve miles of
an existing "high impact solid waste facility."2 '8 This presumption can
be rebutted, among other ways, if "incentives have prompted the host
community to accept the siting of the facility."2 '9 This type of
216. Since different facilities contain varying benefits and burdens, and different communities
are differently situated, the question of how facilities will be distributed amongst communities
remains. See, e.g., Been, supra note 69, 1033-40 (discussing problems with measuring and distributing
burdens and benefits of different facilities). For example:
[t]wo neighborhoods hosting identical hazardous waste treatment plants... might bear
different burdens if the basis for comparison is health risk, because the geology or
transportation networks or composition of the workforce of one area could make one plant
somewhat riskier than the other .... When the LULUs being compared are different, such
as a prison and a sludge treatment plant, comparisons will require agreement on how
different criteria are to be weighted or reduced to some common metric such as dollar loss.
Whether and how to translate burdens such as health risks to monetary terms is... a
controversial issue.
Id. at 1033-34.
217. See Staples, supra note 9.
218. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1504(a)(1) (Michie 1993). A "high impact solid waste'management
facility" includes "any solid waste landfill, any solid or commercial hazardous waste incinerator, and
any commercial hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal facility." Id. § 8-6-1502(l)(A). This
defintion seems to exclude as much as it includes. It excludes the following: recycling or compost
facilities; waste-tire management sites; solid waste transfer stations; solid waste landfills which have
applications pending to expand their services or capacity; facilities dedicated solely to the treatment,
storage, or disposal of solid and hazardous waste generated by a private industry if the private
industry bears the expense of operating and maintaining the facility; facilities solely dedicated to a
response action at a location listed by the state or federal government as a hazardous substance site;
existing facilities operating under the interim status of the federal Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act; and existing hazardous waste facilities under RCRA or the Arkansas Hazardous
Waste Act which expand either through increased acreage, provision for additional services, or
increased capacity. See id. § 8-6-1502(l)(B).
219. Id. Such incentives could include, without limitation: increased employment opportunities,
reasonable host fees not to exceed the prevailing state average, contributions by the facility to the
community infrastructure, compensation to adjacent individual landowners for any assessed decrease
in property values, or subsidization of community services. See id. § 8-6-1504(b)(2). The presumption
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rebuttable presumption ostensibly preserves community choice in the
siting process, appealing to the communities' self-determining impulses
to make their own decisions whether to accept a controversial facility.
However, allowing the presumption to be rebutted by evidence of in-
centives may not constrain choice enough, given the current structural
disadvantages of communities such as Chester. Proffers of increased
employment opportunities and host fees will often be subject to the
charge of environmental blackmail.' It is precisely the poorest com-
munities which will have the greatest incentives to site such a facility.
This reliance on evidence of incentive thus reinforces the original vul-
nerability of poor communities which the presumption was designed to
address. Without technical support from the state agency or an assur-
ance that technical experts have consulted with the community about the
potential social and economic hazards of the proposed facility, the
community's choice may remain under a cloud of suspicion.
Another policy trend which might make distributive remedies more
responsive to the concerns of disaffected communities is the adoption of
so-called soft criteria in the siting process. For instance, decision-makers
considering whether to issue a permit for another waste facility in
Chester would be able to take into account its falling property values,
cumulative health risks, and other costs existing facilities impose on the
community. Environmental risk assessment and management are as
much social and political issues as they are legal or technical issues."
Therefore, in addition to technical criteria-proximity to wetlands, ge-
ology of the site, impact on ground water, and impact on health-
normally considered in assessing the impact of a proposed facility on
the host community, some state statutes and proposed bills require or
allow decision-makers to give weight to social and political factors. 2
can also be rebutted if "no other suitable site for such a facility is available within the regional solid
waste management district because of the restraints of geology or any other factors listed [in the
technical assessment criteria]." Id. at § 8-6-1504(b)(1). See also H.B. 1195, 61st Leg., 2d Sess. (Colo.
1998) (creating identical presumption, rebuttable upon evidence that the host community "desires"
the facility because of incentives offered by the facilities and evidence that no other suitable site is
available).
220. See Bullard, supra note 106, at 83-84 (explaining that minority communities are often
vulnerable to economic inducements and may minimize their opposition to sitings whose risks might
outweigh their benefits because these communities are beset by rising unemployment, extreme
poverty, a shrinking tax base, and a decaying business infrastructure).
221. See Daniel J. Fiomo, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical Review, 14
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501, 503-04, 512-14 (1989); Joseph P. Tomain, Distributional Consequences of
Environmental Regulation: Economics, Politics, and Environmental Policymaking, 1 KAN. JL. &
Pu. PoL'Y 101, 110 (Summer 1991) (arguing cost-benefit analysis is deficient because it obscures
sociopolitical norms); Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Interest, 41
STAN. L REV. 1021, 1043 (1989) (reviewing MARK SAGOFF, THE EcONOMY OF EARTH (1988))
(arguing that "cost-benefit analysis is misused to provide technocratic solutions to fundamentally
political questions").
222. See Tarlock, supra note 113, at 149-50.
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These social factors can include consideration of the socioeconomic
status of the host community, community perceptions, psychic costs, the
potential for change in property values, the presence of other facilities
in the community, and the cumulative risks presented from other
sources in the host community.'
The main problem with soft criteria, however, is that often there is
no guidance as to the weight decision-makers should, or can, give to
these factors in the siting process.'2 More often than not, administrators
retain considerable discretion, allowing for the possibility that these cri-
teria will be ultimately ignored in the final decision.
Even with the incorporation of community input and soft criteria
into the siting process, there might still be a risk that low-income com-
munities of color and their concerns will not be treated with dignity and
respect in the decision-making process. State administrative agencies
still have almost complete discretion and control over the decision, and
the community is relegated to a tangential role. For reasons discussed in
the next Section, environmental justice for communities such as Chester
must also include policy reforms which treat those most at risk from
proposed facilities as partners in an openly deliberative decision-making
process.
B. The Promise of Participatory Democracy:
Taking Process Seriously
Environmental decision-making, as with much of administrative
decision-making, partly gains its legitimacy from the democratic norm
embedded in much of environmental law,' particularly its public par-
ticipation provisions.226 Public participation provisions promise to
223. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-30-5.1(d) (1990) (requiring selection committee to consider and
include in its written report the "social and economic impacts of the proposed facility on the affected
community, including changes in property values, community perception and other costs"); KY. REv.
STAT. Ai. § 244.855(1)(c) (Michie 1995) (requiring agency to consider "community perceptions
and other psychic costs"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-325(a) (1996) (requiring considerations of
"socioeconomic and demographic data" in selecting or approving a site for a new sanitary landfill
that is located within one mile of an existing sanitary landfill); H.B. 518, 90th Leg., ist Sess. § 15 (II.
1997) (requiring a community impact statement "written in plain language and limiting the use of
technical terms" to provide information about, among other things, "the presence of any other
existing toxic chemical facilities and hazardous waste sites in the affected community"); H.B. 2103,
1st Sess. § 7 (Tex. 1997) (requiring consideration of "cumulative risks," including the combined level
of noise, odor, and other impacts, in an administrative proceeding involving the siting or expansion of
operation of a facility in an area where other facilities are located).
224. But see, e.g., H.B. 518, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. § 15 (Ill. 1997) (instructing local permitting
authority to "give great weight to the community impact statement when making a final decision
regarding the issuance of a permit").
225. See, e.g., Fiorino, supra note 221, at 523-30; Douglas R. Williams, Environmental Law and
Democratic Legitimacy, 4 DuKE ENvmL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 6-31 (1994).
226. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots
Activists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENviT. W. 687, 689-91 (1995)
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include the public in the decision-making process by providing them, at
least, with notice about a proposed siting and an opportunity to com-
ment on the proposed action.' However, precisely what type of
democratic process or community participation does or should underlie
environmental decision-making processes has never been established.
The model that best describes current participatory norms in environ-
mental law is a pluralistic, interest-group representation model, which, in
practice, tends to exclude or silence some groups.'
(summarizing broadly the public participation provisions in federal and state environmental laws);
Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and
Equitable Compensation, 56 Onio ST. LJ. 329, 370 (1995) (noting that "[m]ost commentators,
including the author, have argued in favor of increased public participation in environmental decision
making primarily because such participation is consistent with democratic values and because
administrative decision making has its own limitations"); Ellison Folk, Comment, Public Participation
in the Superfund Cleanup Process, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173, 178-80 (1991).
227. A typical administrative process used in local land-use decisions is as follows:
Before a company applies for a local land-use permit, it sends a letter of intent to the local
agency. The agency then holds a pre-application hearing. The purpose of this hearing is to
explain the project and the permitting process. Next, the company files a formal application
with the agency. At this point, the agency evaluates potential environmental effects of the
project. If the project will have a potentially significant effect on the environment, state law
directs the agency to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR). The local agency
holds a meeting to determine the scope of the EIR. This scoping meeting is open to the
public, but is often attended exclusively by officials from other governmental agencies. The
agency then prepares an EIR (or contracts with a consultant to produce such a report)
detailing the potential effects of the project. This EIR is circulated for public comment to
anyone requesting it. Thereafter, the local agency prepares a response to public comments
to anyone requesting it. Local agencies will often hold public hearings on the EIR. Finally,
the local agency will decide whether to permit the project, theoretically basing its decision
on the EIR and public comment. If a proponent or opponent of the project is unhappy with
that decision, he or she can then file a lawsuit.
Cole, supra note 226, at 692-93.
228. See Morino, supra note 221 at 525-29. After reviewing the participation movement and its
legacy in environmental law, Fiorino explains:
Effective participation requires organization, resources, and professional representation.
Participation at the national level typically is indirect, because it is mediated through
voluntary associations organized to assert related interests. Often participation is equated
with opposition. The public is placed in a reactive posture: comments are noted, views are
heard, opportunities are presented. But we rarely see a sharing of power or the
codetermination of policy. The process concedes a marginal role to the individual citizen.
Genuine influence is granted reluctantly, minimally, and to interests with the capacity to
obstruct decisions later. Participation is biased, because it draws on groups with the needed
information, competence, and resources. It is skewed in the way that it solicits the
participation of those with the most to lose or the greatest intensity of feeling on an issue.
Id. at 529; see also YOUNG, supra note 3, at 183-84 ("Where some groups are materially privileged
and exercise cultural imperialism, formally democratic processes often elevate the particular
experiences and perspectives of the privileged groups, silencing or denigrating those of oppressed
groups."); Gauna, supra note 209, at 25 (noting that "public hearings for permits and other discrete
environmental decisions, notice and comment requirements for rulemaking proceedings, and citizen
advisory groups to the EPA are generic institutional mechanisms intended to promote access and
equal footing among, in agency parlance, 'stakeholders"'); id. at 37 (noting that undue reliance on a
pluralistic model of participation is problematic because "preferences are defined by the relative
power of self-interested subjects" and such preferences "may be distorted by existing inequalities,
poorly construed as a result of exclusion and unequal political clout").
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Grassroots experiences like those in Chester suggest the need to
rethink the theory and practice of participatory decision-making proc-
esses in environmental law. As environmental justice advocates have ar-
gued, meaningful participation by those most affected by environmental
decisions is a crucial component of assessing the fairness of environ-
mental decisions.2 9 When communities receive inadequate notice or re-
ceive information that they cannot understand the participatory nature
of the decision-making processes is called into serious question.20 How-
ever, even when decision-making processes are open, formal access may
not be enough. For instance, where inclusion in the decision-making
processes is merely co-optive of community opposition and/or makes
no difference in the decisions, the pluralistic nature of the process is in
doubt."' More fundamentally, agency decision-makers' overemphasis
on technical assessments of the proposed facility, to the exclusion of
socioeconomic assessments, add to the perception that public participa-
tion has little, if any, effect on influencing agency actions in siting deci-
sions.13 Given current social and structural inequalities, problems of
accountability and special interest influence are likely to render tradi-
tional participatory processes problematic in racially and economically
229. See Robert D. Bullard, Introduction, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, at xvii ("What
do grass-roots leaders want? These leaders are demanding a shared role in decision-making
processes that affect their communities. They want participatory democracy to work for them.');
Deeohn Ferds, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: Expanding Public Participation
in the Federal Superfund Program, 21 FORDeHAM UPB. LJ. 671, 675 (1994) (suggesting that limited
public involvement in cleanup decisions may explain why a National Law Journal study found that
cleanups under the Superfund program took longer in minority and low-income communities); Torres,
supra note 112, at 453-54 (advocating redefinition of the "regulatory culture" to include affected
communities in the decision-making process).
230. See, e.g., El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, No. 366045,
22 Envtl. L. Rep. 20357 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento County, Dec. 30, 1991) (overturning the
county's permit for a toxic waste incinerator partly because the county failed to provide a largely
Latino community with Spanish translations for the environmental reports and public hearing
documents).
231. See Cole, supra note 226, at 701 ("[C]ommunities learn the hard way that the public
participation process is not designed to hear and address their concerns, but instead to manage,
diffuse, and ultimately co-opt community opposition to projects."); Ferris, supra note 229, at 675
(1994) (arguing that public participation requirements in environmental statutes are "largely intended
as community relations efforts" rather than substantive deliberative processes); Lawrence E.
Susskind, Overview of Developments in Public Participation, in PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKUNG 2 (Elissa C. Lichtenstein & William T. Dunn eds., 1994) (noting
that final administrative procedures are "unlikely to be affected by" citizen input at public hearings,
and that "[c]losure, or agreement, is reached by elected or appointed officials behind closed doors").
232. See Ann Bray, Comment, Scientific Decision Making: A Barrier to Citizen Participation in
Environmental Agency Decision Making, 17 WM. MITCHELL L REV. 1111, 1115 (1991) (recounting
results of a study which concludes that "the failure of citizens to influence environmental decision
makers is directly related to the inability of the scientific decision-making process to accommodate
cultural and political rationality in agency decision making"); see also James S. Freeman & Rachel D.
Godsil, The Question of Risk. Incorporating Community Perceptions in Environmental Risk
Assessments, 21 FORDHAM UP.B. LJ. 547 (1994).
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disadvantaged communities. 3 As long as the decision-making process
is neutral towards these structural barriers to adequate participation, it
will continue to replicate them, and the process will never be seen as le-
gitimately democratic to those who are most affected by the decisions.2
To be sure, as the Chester struggle illustrates, disaffected communi-
ties recognize the limits of traditional participatory processes. Organiza-
tions such as CRCQL are forced to look outside of these processes to
ensure that their views, their concerns, and their expertise about prob-
lems in their communities are ultimately represented in the final deci-
sion."s Their need to go outside of these processes, as CRCQL did,
suggests that new norms or models of participation may be needed in
order to legitimize environmental decision-making processes so that all
affected communities have an opportunity to participate meaningfully.
A crucial policy reform toward achieving environmental justice for
communities such as Chester is to move from the current pluralistic,
interest-group representation model to a more deliberative model of
participation in the siting process. Shared knowledge, collective deci-
sion-making, and free and equal discourse among participants, rather
than formal access and the aggregation of pre-existing preferences
should form the foundation for the deliberative process. 6 Toward that
end, certain questions should be asked when evaluating the legitimacy
of participatory decision-making processes in the siting process: (1)
whether those most affected by the decision either have an opportunity
to participate directly or to be represented in each phase of the
decision-making process; (2) whether the community is informed
233. See supra note 228.
234. See Mank, supra note 226, at 369 (noting that "because wealthy people have greater access
to lawyers, lobbyists, and the media, a key question is whether any siting process that incorporates
public opinion can temper the tendency to site facilities where people are relatively powerless").
235. Some of the techniques employed outside of formal public participation processes have
been passed down from other social movements-such as public protests, demonstrations, coalition
building with more powerful groups, letter-writing campaigns, and developing technical expertise-
while others are distinct to environmental justice struggles-such as "toxic tours" of heavily polluted
low-income and/or minority neighborhoods to educate the media, decision-makers, and other
supporters. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 226, at 697-701; Peggy M. Shepard, Issues of Community
Empowerment, 21 FORDHAM URB. U. 739,753 (1994).
236. As Seyla Benhabib explains:
According to the deliberative model of democracy, it is a necessary condition for attaining
legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decision-making processes in a polity,
that the institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is considered in the common
interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation conducted rationally and
fairly among free and equal individuals. The more collective decision-making processes
approximate this model, the more it increases the presumption of their legitimacy and
rationality.
Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFRENCE,
supra note 136, at 69; see also JUrgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 136, at 21 (describing the "deliberative model of politics"
and contrasting it with liberal and republican models).
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adequately about all available information regarding the proposed ac-
tion and whether such information is accessible; (3) whether the agency
is responsive to community knowledge and concerns; and (4) whether
decision-making power and influence is shared between those asked to
bear the greatest risk, those who stand to benefit the most, and the insti-
tutions, administrators, and technical experts responsible for the ultimate
decision. 7
What would such a process look like? While it is beyond the scope
of this Article to construct such a process, the public participation re-
form that best approximates the model I have in mind was contained in
the proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994.11 Even though this bill
had a wide base of support, it ultimately failed. It required the EPA to
provide "early, direct, and meaningful community involvement in each
significant phase of the response activities taken under the Act." 9 To
do this, the bill eased the requirements for technical assistance grants,
required the involvement of affected citizens earlier and more often in
all stages of cleanup, provided for more public meetings, and estab-
lished citizen information and access offices.'4 The bill also expressly
required the EPA to make its information accessible and suitable for the
unique cultural needs of the affected community."4
The most significant aspect of this legislation, in terms of delibera-
tive democratic principles, was the creation of Community Working
237. See DANIEL S. IACOFANO, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 13 (1990) (describing the criteria with which to evaluate meaningful public
participation as public interest representation, information exchange between the public and the
agency, public interest mediation and acceptability, and agency responsiveness); Homo, supra note
221, at 536-39 (discussing the "participatory ideal" based upon participatory theorists such as
B. Barber, J. Mansbridge, and C. Pateman); Pub. Participation & Accountability Subcommittee, Nat'l
Envti. Just. Advisory Council, Model Plan for Public Participation (visited Jan. 14, 1998)
<http.//www.prcemi.com:80/nejae/publicat.html> (reporting public participation checklist containing
thirty-five specific recommendations for environmental agencies, including the recognition of
community and indigenous knowledge, creation of an atmosphere of equal participation, creation of
co-sponsorship and co-planning relationships, and a recognition of environmental justice stakeholders
as full partners).
238. See H.R. 3800, 103d Cong. (1994); S. 1834, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (1994). See John H.
Cushman Jr., Congress Forgoes Its Bid to Hasten Cleanup of Dumps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at Al
(reporting that the bill garnered support from oil, chemical, and insurance industries, labor and
environmental groups, and state and local governments).
239. S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(c) (1994). The bill actually refers to the president in
many places, but pursuant to an executive order, the president has delegated much of his authority to
the EPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987).
240. See S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); see also Richard E. Bartlet & David E. Polter,
Summary of the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 608, 611 (July 29,
1994).
241. See S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(c) (1994) (requiring that information be presented
orally and distributed in foreign languages where appropriate).
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Groups (CWGs) at each site. 2 The bill established the following
procedure: the EPA would nominate citizens from the affected commu-
nity to sit on the CWG; the membership on the CWG would be limited to
twenty members;243 and the two main functions of the group would be to
serve as a local information clearinghouse and as an advisory group to
the EPA.'" The CWG membership could include a broad variety of
people, ranging from persons living or owning property immediately
adjacent to the facility, members of the local medical community, local
officials, facility workers, facility owners, local businesses, members of
public interest groups, persons potentially affected by releases from the
facility, and representatives of Native-American tribes."4 The EPA was
urged to consider seriously the CWG's recommendations and respond
to the working group's concerns and proposals in writing.46
Despite the potential for this type of reform to enhance meaningful
public participation in communities such as Chester, there are weak-
nesses imbedded in the proposed bill which go to the very essence of
the deliberative model discussed earlier. The first weakness pertains to
the level of representation on CWGs. In terms of representation, while
the bill sought inclusion from a broad cross-section of affected citizens,
it spoke in permissive rather than mandatory terms. The bill provided
that it is "appropriate" for the EPA to include representation from the
above-mentioned groups. 7 Given the discretion inherent in that provi-
sion, the very groups currently left out of decision-making processes
could continue to be left out, whether by oversight or otherwise. More-
over, since the bill did not specify the number of persons to be included
from each listed category of interests, and given the limit on the size of
the CWG, it is quite possible that those most adversely affected by the
242. See S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1994). EPA already had experience with
community workgroups as part of its own public participation programs, which it initiated before
Congressional mandates to involve communities in the cleanup process. The EPA's experiences with
these groups, however, has been limited and not as extensive as this bill would mandate. See
generally Folk, supra note 226, at 193-212.
243. This limit would address the concern that excessive public participation impedes agency
deliberation. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok. The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173 (1998). Rossi argues that while threshold levels of
participation often improve the quality of agency decisions, participation can, and does, affect
ordinary agency decisions adversely. Id. at 179-80, 212-15. For instance, excessive participation
may, in the context of the environmental impact statement procedure, create information problems,
encourage use of strategic delay and thwart the development of agency programs. Id. at 224-28.
244. See H.R. 3800, 103d Congress, § 103(i) (1994); S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1994).
245. Id.
246. See S. 1834, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. § 105 (1994).
247. See H.R. 3800, 103d Cong. § 103(i)(4) (1994).
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decision would obtain only token representation, while others would be
better represented.2
The second weakness pertains to decision-making power. The CWG
would serve an advisory function only. Although the EPA was coun-
seled to be responsive, the agency retained discretion to dismiss or dis-
count a CWG's concerns or recommendations in the final decision.249
Hence, not only would the CWG lack decision-making authority, it
likely would also lack any influence in the decision-making process.
In short, citizen advisory committees, such as CWGs, are only a first
step toward improving communication between environmental decision-
makers and affected communities. If public participation processes in
environmental law are to move toward a more deliberative process, even
stronger reforms will be necessary. Siting review committees and boards
must ensure adequate representation or direct participation of those who
will bear most of the risk and burdens inherent in a proposed site.'
Moreover, decision-making under a deliberative model should include
both a greater degree of agency responsiveness to those most affected
by the decision and increased shared decision-making power. When the
element of collective deliberation and decision-making is not present,
communities such as Chester will continue to feel that the "system is
stacked and that no amount of participation by itself will change the
relations of power that give rise to environmental degradation.""1  As
long as this sentiment exists in disaffected communities, the call for jus-
tice in environmental decision-making will continue to grow louder.
248. Representation can be a key issue in determining whether a proposed public-participation
reform is a compelling alternative to the current pluralistic decision-making model in environmental
law. See Rossi, supra note 243, at 244-45. Ideally, within a deliberative model, public-participation
requirements should include representatives who are both "empowered to speak for the group they
claim to represent" and able to "act for" the group they represent by mediating, rather than merely
aggregating, the interests of the group. Id. at 245-46. Representatives would thus "enable individual
group members to gain access to the contents of the deliberative agency decision-making process,
while also expressing to agency decisionmakers a group position." Il at 245.
249. However, one of the EPA's administrators did remark that the remedy selection process
"could be amended to give community work groups great deference in remedy selection: the agency
would have to make a 'strong showing' to ignore the community's recommendation." Mank, supra
note 226, at 374 n.259 (quoting Mary Bryant, Environmental Justice Forum, SONREEL NEws,
July/Aug. 1994, at 8 (reporting a speech by Elliot Laws on April 29, 1994 at the Environmental Justice
Forum in Dallas)).
250. Of course, what constitutes a burden or benefit is a complex issue. As one commentator has
noted, "In order to compare burdens ... society must be able to identify the winners and losers of a
particular siting decision, as well as to calculate their gains or losses with some precision.
Unfortunately, the techniques of costlbenefit analysis have not achieved the requisiste level of
sophistication." Been, supra note 69, at 1039. The fact that current scientific analysis cannot calculate
the costs and benefits accurately, in my view, is even more reason to have deliberative decision-
making processes.
251. Cole, supra note 226, at 697 (relating the view of many community activists).
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C. Strong Democracy and the Transformative Politics
of the Grassroots Environmental Justice Movement
Grassroots groups such as CRCQL have not had the time to await
reforms in environmental decision-making processes. Even while oper-
ating under the influence of various social and structural constraints,
Chester residents have been able to construct a direct political strategy
and establish a grassroots base to influence environmental decision-
making in their community. However, as the current situation in Chester
indicates, the residents' success remains tentative and subject to the same
constraints that threaten to overwhelm their resistance. An ever-
changing political landscape further frustrates reform efforts. Never-
theless, groups such as CRCQL already have begun to transform envi-
ronmental politics and the representation of marginalized communities
in the environmental decision-making process.
One of the ways in which this transformation is occurring is that
groups such as CRCQL are practicing a strong version of participatory
democracy, whereby "self-governing citizens ... participate in the talk
through which questions are formulated and given a decisive political
conception." 2 The process of strong participatory democracy in
Chester progressed through various stages of evolution, in which they"creat[ed] greater political consciousness among the potential partici-
pants, directly confront[ed] entrenched economic and statist powers,
present[ed] their cause to the larger public, cultivat[ed] support among
various constituencies, and develop[ed] sufficient internal and external
resources so that they could mobilize large numbers when neces-
sary." 3 CRCQL's struggle also evolved from a confrontational mode
in which they demanded answers from decision-makers, to a more so-
phisticated deliberative mode which included the mastery of technical
language, and finally to a coalition mode in which they drew upon the
resources of other citizens. As importantly, CRCQL became an effective
political actor in the decision-making process by affecting the local
decision-making processes through protesting and lobbying for ordi-
nances.
In the process of building its strong democratic movement, CRCQL
created what Harry Boyte and Sara Evans have called free spaces,"settings which create new opportunities for self-definition, for the de-
velopment of public and leadership skills, for a new confidence in the
possibilities of participation, and for wider mappings of the connections
252. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEw Ace
196 (1984).
253. PULIDO, supra note 4, at 197.
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between the movement members and other groups and institutions."'
Part of what sustains these free spaces-in which ordinary people move
from complainers and victims to participants in the processes which
govern their lives-is the realization by local groups that power relation-
ships within a decision-making structure are fluid and contestableZ"
Once this realization takes hold, as it did in Chester, participants move
from a reactive to a proactive mode in which decision-makers respond
to their concerns.
What do the strategies of these grassroots groups mean for the fu-
ture of environmentalism? Grassroots activists, such as the members of
CRCQL, create a level of environmental self-determination once non-
existent in their communities. It is not that these communities are just
beginning to care about environmental issues. Rather, these communi-
ties have come to realize that the mainstream environmental movement
has constructed a notion of environmentalism which fails to address the
material concerns of low-income communities of color. 6 Grassroots
environmental justice activists recognize this neglect and hope to con-
struct a new meaning of environmentalism, linking environmental pres-
ervation to their material environment and community.
The notion of "environment" for environmental justice groups
and networks has come to mean "home" and "community." 7 These
are the places that need to be preserved and protected from pollutants
and other harms. This "community preservation" principle 5 recog-
nizes that the harms resulting from the disenfranchisement of the most
vulnerable communities from environmental decision-making are not
only health-related, but include non-health-related consequences-such
as the reduction of community cohesion and socioeconomic damage,
254. SARA M. EVANS & HARRY C. BOYTE, FREE SPACES: THE SOURCES OF DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE IN AMERICA xix (1986).
255. As Evans and Boyte explain:
If power relationships in many settings are sharply unequal, they also are always contested
and mutually transformative. One never simply "acts on" another-any process of action
always has reciprocal moments, changing both partners in the drama. Groups of people in
society are never simply or completely "powerless"; there are always resources,
stratagems, and social and cultural maneuvers available to and used by even those who
seem at first appearance most unambiguously victimized. Out of the density and complexity
of power dynamics ... relatively autonomous popular activity-what can be called "free
spaces"-can be sustained over long periods.
Id. at xvii; see also Winter, supra note 143.
256. As Regina Austin and Michael Schill explain, "[Iln the view of many people of color,
environmentalism is associated with the preservation of wildlife and wilderness, which simply is not
more important than the survival of people and the communities in which they live; thus, the
mainstream [environmental] movement has its priorities screwed." Regina Austin & Michael Schill,
Black, Brown, Red, and Poisoned, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 58.
257. Cynthia Hamilton, Women, Home & Community: The Struggle in an Urban Environment,
RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Apr. 1990, at 3.
258. See Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination,
41 U. KAN. L REV. 271 (1992).
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resulting from the loss of businesses, homes, and schools.," The initial
rallying point for many communities is the destruction of their quality
of life-from the invasion of trucks, dust, and noise that accompany the
existence of a waste facility in their neighborhood. Only later do resi-
dents see the link to actual health effects.
However, to reduce grassroots struggles to a new consciousness
about environmental concerns-even as that term is construed
broadly-would be a mistake. As Giovanna Di Chiro explains:
The notion that grassroots, community-based, social and racial-
justice driven organizations are composed of "new environ-
mentalists" is contested terrain. Questions of the importance of
self-representation, definitional clarity, and the agency inherent
in "speaking for ourselves" are key issues for movement activ-
ists. What is "new" about the environmental justice movement is
not the "elevated environmental consciousness" of its members
but the ways that it is transforming the possibilities for funda-
mental social and environmental change through processes of
redefinition, reinvention, and construction of innovative political
and cultural discourses and practices. This includes, among other
things, the articulation of concepts of environmental justice and
environmental racism and the forging of new forms of grass-
roots political organization.W
Indeed, the next phase in the transformation of environmental jus-
tice participants, and their local communities, lies in forging partner-
ships and networking with grassroots organizations across substantive
areas.""' As CRCQL has done in Chester, environmental justice groups
are networking with other groups to provide information and technical
expertise to grassroots constituencies on various issues of interest to dis-
enfranchised communities.262 Because of these networks, residents in
marginal communities will continue to shape environmental policy and
259. In rare but remarkable fashion, at least one court has acknowledged the presence of these
multidimensional harms. See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.
Tex. 1979), affid, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). While rejecting the claim that the government's
decision to grant a permit to site a solid waste facility in a minority community was discriminatory, the
court nevertheless recognized that the proposed solid waste facility would affect the entire nature of
the community-its land values, its tax base, its aesthetics, its inhabitants' health and safety, and its
high school located 1,700 feet from the site.
260. Giovanna Di Chiro, Refraining Environmental History: Nature, Environment, and
Community in the Environmental Justice Movement 13 (Dec. 2, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
261. See, e.g., Richard Moore & Louis Head, Building a Net That Works: SWOP, in UNEQUAL
PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 191 (describing the Southwest Organizing Project, a multi-racial, multi-
issue, community-based organization located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, whose mission is to
empower the disenfranchised in the Southwest to realize social, racial, and economic justice.)
262. See Who Is the Pennsylvania Environmental Nenvork (PEN)? (visited Jan. 8, 1998)
<http.//www.envirolink.orglorgs/penL/about.html> (describing network of grassroots organizations,
including CRCQL, throughout the state of Pennsylvania).
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create more opportunities for community input into the spectrum of
policy-making which affect their material conditions. 63 Only the future
will prove whether, and to what extent, these networks can consolidate
the power of varied local organizations such as CRCQL and implement
an agenda for environmental and social justice for society's most vul-
nerable members. Until then, the success of groups such as CRCQL
suggests that the goal is not out of reach.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to situate grassroots experiences and
struggles at the center of the environmental (in)justice analysis. A close
look at the political economy of communities such as Chester,
Pennsylvania illustrates that racial and class disparities in the distribution
of environmental hazards are produced by, and within, a particular sys-
tem of social relations and structure. Grassroots experiences, such as
those in Chester, are crucial to both understanding the social relations
and processes underlying distributive outcomes and to evaluating the
efficacy of reforms in the siting process.
As Chester illustrates, the environmental injustice phenomenon
goes beyond the racial and class maldistribution so well documented in
numerous empirical studies. Environmental injustice manifests itself
through environmental decision-making processes. Thus, policy-makers
should continue to reexamine the foundations of both substantive crite-
ria and participatory processes in reforming the siting process. While
current and proposed reforms are a step toward a more equitable siting
process, environmental justice in communities such as Chester will re-
quire stronger participatory norms in the siting process. Until then,
groups such as CRCQL in Chester will continue to build a grassroots
base to influence local environmental decision-making processes, even
while operating under severe social and structural constraints which ren-
der their victories so tentative.
263. As Peggy Shepard, a community activist, eloquently explained:
While it is important to work at the community level to develop viable programs, it is also
crucial to build at the community level an advocacy base to bring issues, concerns, needs,
and ideas of communities of color to the policy making and decisionmaking process. This
strategy allows communities to impact public policy at the front end rather than being in a
reactive mode.
Shepard, supra note 235, at 750.
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